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Introduction
"what makes the diﬀerence between a low level of living and la miseria (i.e. the misery) comes
from culture. Unlike the primitive, the peasant feels himself part of a larger society which he is
’in’ but not altogether ’of.’" (Banfield, 1958)
The idea of specific values and beliefs (i.e. "culture") as, ceteris paribus, the main explanatory
of growth diﬀerentials, has recently received lot of attention by social scientists. Economists, in
particular, focus on certain shared values and beliefs, constituting a social "stock" of good values
fostering growth and cooperation. Thus the name, social capital. This interest is motivated by the
resilience of development gaps across and within similar countries, even after years (or decades, as
in the case of the Southern Italy) of ad ad-hoc policy programmes. Identifying the "right" values
conducive to growth (and how to breed them) could become a new policy paradigm. Unfortunately,
social capital is an elastic concept (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Moreover, to the extent that social
interactions type and strength matter, social capital clearly requires attention for the role of space.
Thus, this thesis attempts to clarify some of the issues related to social capital and space. Keeping
in mind these considerations, the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 1 outlines the main questions of this thesis. At first, the concept of social capital is in-
vestigated through a careful review of the socio-economic literature, where social capital emerges as
a multidimensional (and multidisciplinary) topic. In order to achieve a synthesis, following "Solow’s
critique" (Solow, 1995) and Guiso et al. (2011), we focus on the concept of "civic capital", i.e.
"those persistent values and shared beliefs, which allow a group to overcome the free rider problem
in the pursuit of socially valuable activities". It follows the need to understand the relationship be-
tween social capital and economic growth. Indeed, several channels have been documented, namely
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crime, corruption, trust, thriftiness, productivity, ethnicity, religion and, last but not least, migra-
tion, which is the natural carrier of values and beliefs in communities with diﬀerent socio-economic
characteristics. Unfortunately, there are also many confounding factors at work, such as human
capital and institutions, complicating the identification. On top of that, a theory of capital requires,
by definition, a clear (dis)investment process. Therefore, we select and present four models of cul-
tural transmission which capture the dynamics of (dis)investment of social capital, focusing on the
role of parents and the socio-economic environment. Moreover, some of these models provide an
explanation for values persistence and impact on policy.
Once some important theoretical issues have been discussed, we focus on the relevant empirical
studies, in particular with respect to its measurement. Indeed, social capital has been the object of
extensive research, with the consequent abundance of empirical measures, also requiring some degree
of synthesis. Chapter 2 abides to this task and expands the discussion to consider the relationship
between social capital and space. Indeed, social capital can be transmitted within an horizontal
continuous space marked by distance, an horizontal discontinuous space marked by borders and a
hierarchical space with discontinuities due to multiple levels of markets and governance. Clearly,
handling spatial data requires specific techniques (Anselin and Arribas-Bel, 2011). Spatial econo-
metrics tools are discussed, with particular reference to dynamic spatial techniques. Apart from
space, another technical issue is represented by the multidimensional nature of social capital, a sign
of the richness of the concept, unfortunately complicating also the analysis. To the extent we want
to preserve such multidimensional nature, without using single variables as proxy for more compli-
cated concepts, we need specific techniques to achieve data reduction. Our choice is the Principal
Component Analysis (PCA).
Previous chapters reported on the complex world of social capital. In Chapter 3, building on
previous considerations, we propose new synthetic measures of social capital. We also explore
the diﬀerence between the "structural" and "cognitive" component of social capital suggested by
Righi and Scalise (2013), with particular reference to the spatial distribution of social capital across
Europe, looking for possible clusters of regions sharing similar values and beliefs.
Eventually, previous chapters were conductive to an analysis of social capital and economic
growth, with particular reference to sub national divides. In this regard, we refer to previous work
7
by Tabellini (2010). Focusing on European regions, he analyses the factors inducing economic growth
diﬀerentials, with social capital, ceteris paribus, having a significant and sizable explanatory power.
However, results are likely biased due to endogeneity. In the last Chapter we try to formally test the
existence of a weak instruments problem, following Stock and Yogo (2002) and Kleibergen and Paap
(2006). Once the problem is verified, we proceed along the cited literature linking social capital and
space (LeSage and Fischer 2008; Anselin and Arribas-Bel 2011 for technicalities), and introduce a
spatial regression approach, in order to solve the likely misspecification problem. This conclude
our inspection of social capital: from theoretical issues related to the definition, across a review
of empirical measures. Then we define new measures used in a within country analysis. The last
chapter draws some conclusions and highlights some possible policy implications and suggestions
for further research.
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Chapter 1
Social capital: an extended review of the
relevant literature
Much has been said about social capital1, but still, there is little consensus on the meaning nor on
the origin of the term2. In what follows there will be an attempt to clarify the definition of social
capital (section 1.1), disentangling the channels through which it aﬀects economic growth (section
1.2). Eventually, a theory of (social) capital cannot ignore accumulation nor, in this specific case,
transmission processes: four selected models of cultural transmission are presented in section 1.3.
1.1 What is social capital?
Durlauf (1999) credits Loury (1977) as the first talk about social capital (at least in the economics
literature), focusing on the income diﬀerentials across ethnic groups due to social networks: Glaeser
et al. (1999) praise Jacobs (1961) and its ’neighbouring eﬀects’. Instead, de Blasio and Sestito
(2011) and Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) date it back to Hanifan (1916), who used the term
1As of November 2013, there were more than 11.292 search results on Ideas, 98.845 on Jstor and an astonishing
731 millions on Google.
2Arrow (1999) has even suggested to discard the term, while Durlauf (1999) says that "there is strong reason to
ask whether the rise in interest in social capital is due to its demonstrated strength in elucidating socio-economic
phenomena or whether it is the intellectual equivalent of a stock market bubble.", although it’s unanimously recognized
its important role as lubricant of a social system (Arrow, 1974).
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to describe the active support of local communities towards the Virginia system of rural schools.
Whatever may be the origin, the concept has been mostly ignored by economists until the 90s;
indeed, while definitions were plagued by vagueness, the neoclassical theory of general competitive
equilibrium became dominant and all non-market interactions, such as those related to social capital,
were discarded either because not interesting or, most likely, because they were intractable. In fact,
according to Manski (2000):
"from the perspective of general equilibrium theory, non-market interactions were not phe-
nomena of intrinsic interest. Instead, they were problems of incomplete markets that may
prevent the economy from achieving a social optimum. Welfare economics prescribed that the
externalities created by non-market interactions should, if possible, be eliminated by setting
property rights that would permit trade to take place."
This might explain why the concept has been explored by sociology and political science first,
and just recently ‘discovered’ by economists. In the following, we briefly describe the evolution of
the concept into three domains: sociology, political science and economics.
1.1.1 Social capital: a multidisciplinary concept
Social capital in sociology
For sociologists, social capital is the value accruing from being part of a community, and the focus
is on networks and social interactions (Granovetter, 1973). Indeed, individual actions alone are
not enough whereas the outcome is partially or totally dependent on other agents’ actions. Thus,
each individual establishes a set of durable relationships. To this extent, as pointed out by Bordieu
(1986),
"social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to posses-
sion of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance
and recognition."
Thus social capital is the result of an investment in a network of useful resources with a specific
aim,
"facilitating the achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence or could be
achieved only at a higher cost." (Coleman, 1990)
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However, this definition of social capital is flawed, as networking is something that can be
incorporated in standard model of human capital accumulation (Trigilia, 2011): one could decide
to invest in tertiary education at an expensive Ivy League University for establishing useful and
enduring relationships. Another definition, provided by Coleman (1990), states that
"social capital is the normative structure ensuring that unattended children will be looked
after by adults in the vicinity."
To this extent, social capital is a way to enforce social norms but this interpretation does not
provide a way to measure nor a clearly defined accumulation process. Moreover, while in the
previous example, the social norm was desirable (protecting children), generalizing the definition
could comprise the enforcement of questionable social norms, such as excluding outsiders (protecting
incumbents against newcomers) or punishing deviations (e.g. gangs). Over time, the definition
of social capital based on network analysis has evolved into three separate and almost mutually
exclusive types, according to the type of ties between people: bonding, bridging and linking social
capital (Woolcock, 1998; LSE, 2007). More precisely:
• bonding social capital refers to ties within close community and is the source of amoral famil-
ism;
• bridging social capital characterizes ties between similar, but not immediate, people, such as
those belonging to the same community and it has been the object of vast empirical investi-
gation;
• linking social capital connects people more dissimilar and outside the community, allowing
network members to reach a greater variety of resources. It also refers to the interactions with
public institutions.
Social capital in political science
The seminal work about social capital in political science is due to the case study of Banfield (1958),
an american scholar who spent one year (1955) inMontegrano, a small town of Basilicata, a southern
Italian region, comparing the way of living of the town with that of an American one. He argues
that the backwardness of the former is the result of a specific set of values discouraging cooperation,
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an individualistic society promoting only trust towards family members and peers, which he names
“amoral familism”.
However fascinating, the idea of Banfield is just a case study which can’t be generalized. His
fortunate expression, however, ignited a debate followed by other political scientists, such as Putnam
(1993) and Fukuyama (1995), defining social capital as a group or community property, aﬀecting
the individuals of a city, region or even a country. Focusing on the regional divide in Italy, Putnam
(1993) speak of horizontal vs. vertical relationships characterising Italy in the Middle Ages:
"in the North the crucial social, political, and even religious allegiances and alignments
were horizontal, while those in the South were vertical. Collaboration, mutual assistance, civic
obligation, and even trust - not universal, or course, but extending further beyond the limits of
kinship than anywhere else in Europe in this era - were the distinguishing features in the North.
The chief virtue in the South, by contrast, was the imposition of hierarchy and order on latent
anarchy."
The concept of social capital in the political science literature is tilted in favour of generalized
trust and reciprocity, a set of civic values present in the communities where individuals voluntarily
cooperate, ensuring accountability and law-abidingness. Albeit underlining its “group” dimension,
and having a clear empirical counterpart, this definition lacks a clear mechanism of investment.
Social capital in economics
As previously stated, all non market socio-economic frictions, such as social capital or culture, have
been ignored by economists until recently with the exception of a particular facet, namely, trust,
which can be easily modelled and incorporated in standard models through a probabilistic definition.
As suggested by Gambetta (1988), trust is
"a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another
agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such
action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which
it aﬀects his own action."
Unfortunately, trust is not by itself a “good” cultural trait:
"if there is any society among robbers and murderers, they must at least (...) abstain from
robbing and murdering one another (Smith, 1759)."
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Thus, trust per se it is not enough as we will see in next section.
1.1.2 A new definition of social capital
Multiplicity of definitions is suggestive of the main problem of social capital, i.e. its definition,
starting from the fact that term “capital” is something possessed by someone, while, according to
the generally accepted attributes of social capital, it exists only in relationships with people (Bowles,
1999).
The debate on the definition reached a turning point with Solow (1995):
"if social capital is to be more than a buzzword (...) there needs to be an identifiable process
of investment that adds to the stock, and possibly a process of ’depreciation’ that subtracts
from it. The stock of social capital should somehow be measurable, even inexactly."
Thus, according to Solow, any definition of social capital has to satisfy at least 2 conditions:
1. a well defined investment/depreciation process;
2. a clear measurable empirical counterpart.
However this might be not enough, as pointed out by Bordieu (1977), Gambetta (1988) or
Portes (1998): vagueness of the definition, especially if referring to “social norms” without any
sound restrictions, could easily lead to either bad outcomes or questionable behaviours, as when
interpreted in terms of exclusive relations (Banfield, 1958; Woolcock, 1998).
Durlauf (1999) states that
"to the extent that social capital is appropriately regarded as a set of mechanisms in which
groups implicitly enforce certain behaviours among their members, it is clear that any presump-
tion concerning its virtues is questionable."
Strong group ties or any situation with group coordination above a certain level may favour
entry barriers penalizing outsiders. Moreover, in the American setting, rich of community and
group associations, usually ethnically and economically segregated, there is a serious risk of an
increase in intergroup hostility.
Thus, a further assumption is required:
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3. it does not envisage a negative outcome.
This last requirement excludes all situations in which values and beliefs might cause a negative
economic pay-oﬀ, such as in the case of cooperation leading to monopolies or gangs/Mafia syndicates.
Indeed, in this case, less (but diﬀerent from zero) cooperation is necessary to increase competition:
"even to compete, in a mutually non-destructive way, one needs at some level to trust one’s
competitors to comply with certain rules (Gambetta, 1988)."
In line with the most recent economic literature, Guiso et al. (2011) introduce a specific definition
of social capital, naming it “civic capital” as:
"those persistent values and shared beliefs, which allow a group to overcome the free rider
problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities."
Unlike human capital, civic capital is the result of a social process of investment and requires
individual values and beliefs to be shared by other members of the community. Moreover, by defi-
nition, civic capital excludes negative outcomes and negative social norms. They also present some
empirical counterpart which can be measured and a model focusing on cultural transmission. Thus,
civic capital fully satisfies Solow’s criteria. We discuss some possible models of accumulation/de cu-
mulation of social capital in section 1.3, postponing the discussion on existing empirical counterparts
to chapter 2. We conclude this brief review which served the purpose of proving multidisciplinary
interest in social capital. In the following, we will attempt to summarize the copious literature
exploring the link between social capital and economic growth.
1.2 Social capital and economic development
1.2.1 General discussion
"As every employer knows, the lack of coscienziositá (i.e. conscientiousness) of the labourers of
such countries, for instance Italy as compared with Germany, has been, and to a certain extent
still is, one of the principal obstacles to their capitalistic development." (Weber, 1905)
The relationship between social capital and economic development lies at the root of the interest
for social capital. The idea that, once netted out of human and physical capital and, somehow,
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technological progress, growth diﬀerentials might be explained by other, undefined, socio-economic
covariates, is not recent. Indeed, even though not explicitly mentioning social capital, Weber (1905)
underlines the role of specific values and beliefs (attributed to Protestantism) as the ultimate expla-
nation for the relative economic success of some countries; Smith (1776) reinforces this argument:
"it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity,
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages."
However we should be aware that the relationship between social capital and economic growth is
plagued by concerns of reverse causality. Are values and beliefs, such as generalized trust, aﬀecting
economic growth or does a more prosperous society lead people to be more confident? A nation
with a lively community development environment prefers a more equal distribution of income, or
a skewed distribution changes preferences (and policy)?
These issues have been at the heart of the considerations of several classical authors such as
Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and more recently, Max Weber or Karl Polanyi, mostly arguing
that direction of causality from values to economic growth. For Weber and Polanyi, in a change of
economic regime (such as the passage from a feudal society to a society based on the middle class)
the economic incentives are not enough for entrepreneurs to win against initial barriers, thus the
role of religion, especially protestantism according to Weber (1905), posing the pursuit of wealth as
a moral duty.
On the opposite side, Karl Marx believed that as the hand-mill produced a feudal society (with
its correspondent set of values and beliefs, such as respect for hierarchy), the steam-mill generated
capitalism. Eventually, according to Marx, the economic structure shapes the society and social
interactions. A lively debate on this topic started around WWII, but then, as previously mentioned,
economists lost ground:
"as economic theory increased its mathematical sophistication and the set of tools at its
disposal expanded, no need was felt to introduce other potential explanatory variables that, on
top, were hard to measure. Not only did economics lose any interest in its relation with culture,
but, as it became more self-confident in its own capabilities, it moved to explain culture as a
mere outcome of economic forces." (Guiso et al., 2006)
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This rational approach, mostly Marxian in spirit, is associated with the so-called "Chicago
school" where people’ beliefs, tastes, and values are the rational choices of individuals and society,
with the price system as a way to solve any imbalances (Guiso et al., 2006). Indeed, many authors
(e.g. de Soto, 2003; Zingales, 2012) suggest that, for example, incorporating property rights of
squatters induces changes in preferences, such as having pro-market beliefs (Di Tella et al., 2007).
Becker (1996) points out that some cultural traits such as race, family history or ethnicity are given
and inherited, compared to values and beliefs which are instead the result of an accumulation process.
This sustains a direction of causality from economics towards culture, although experiments proved
that individuals might voluntarily choose not to cooperate even though beneficial (Binmore and
Dasgupta, 1986). In practice, this endogeneity problem is usually solved recurring to instrumental
variables, with all the known issues related to the exogeneity and strength of the instruments.
1.2.2 From social capital to growth
There are several identified channels through which social capital might aﬀect economic growth. A
non definitive list includes: crime, corruption, trust, thriftiness, productivity, ethnicity, religion and,
last but not least, migration. In the following, we will briefly review the main results according to
the identified channels.
As for crime, a measure of social interactions is the only covariate explaining more variance in
crime rates across space than diﬀerences in economic performance (Glaeser et al., 1996). de Blasio
and Nuzzo (2010) find that higher social capital is associated with higher productivity, entrepreneur-
ship and women employment rate. In Italy, Ichino and Maggi (2000) report that preferences for
shirking on the job are driven by the place of birth (proxy of cultural heritage), with southern
migrants more likely to cheat. To the extent preferences for redistribution are involved, Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) show that beliefs in a society providing equal opportunities are more averse
to income redistribution, with Alesina and Angeletos (2005) framing a model supporting this idea.
Guiso et al. (2006) find significant and sizeable eﬀects of social capital, measured by thriftiness: a 10
percentage points increase in the share of people who think thriftiness should be taught to children,
increases the national saving rate by 1.3 percentage points. Indeed, Trigilia (2011) suggests that the
cultural component of social capital could be used as an argument in favour of state intervention:
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the lack of specific values (such as trust or thriftiness) could be fixed through greater education or
socialization, leading to an increase in those values required for inclusive institutions (see also sec-
tion 1.2.4). Using within country data in Italy, Giordano and Tommasino (2011) find that a higher
degree of political engagement, as proxy of social capital, increases the eﬃciency of public service.
Guiso et al. (2008b) find that one standard deviation increase in social capital implies a jump of per
capita income by 70 percent. Other possible channels might be ethnicity and religion. In fact, ethnic
diversity, which is associated to the diﬀerent sets of values and beliefs, reduces people’s willingness
to support public good provision (Dahlberg et al., 2012) and makes people less likely to support
redistribution (Alesina et al., 1999). As for religion, according to Guiso et al. (2003) protestants
support income inequality, on the grounds that it spurs personal competition and commitment,
whilst Roman Catholics (and much more muslims) prefer a more equal distribution.
The role of trust
An important role is given to trust, particularly relevant when transactions involve some unknown
counterpart, when the transaction takes place over a period of time rather than being completed on
the spot, and when the legal protection is imperfect.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) show that income inequality reduces trust, using evidence from
the General Social Survey in the US. In a cross-country exercise, La Porta et al. (1997) find that
the larger the share of trusting people, the smaller the associated inflation rate. Moreover, greater
trust increases judicial eﬃciency and reduces government corruption. Indeed, generalized trust is
required to lower transaction costs (Fukuyama, 1995), overriding situations characterized by pris-
oner’s dilemma and allowing transactions otherwise impossible, even in the presence of an advanced
legal system. As suggested by Arrow (1972),
"virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any
transaction conducted over a period of time."
Moreover, he adds
"much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
confidence."
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Through better coordination and sustanaibility of vertical delegation, trust shapes a comparative
advantage for some firms, with sizeable and significant eﬀects relative to average firm size (Cingano
and Pinotti, 2012). Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack and Zac (2001) report cross-countries
regressions of trust on economic growth finding significative positive eﬀect. In Italy, the divide
between areas with higher levels of trust vs. areas with lower levels (notably, North vs. South),
explains higher households’ investments in stocks, use of bank checks and less recourse to informal
credit, while northern firms are more likely to have multiple shareholders (Guiso et al., 2004). More
generally, lower growth rates in former soviet countries of central and eastern Europe are mainly
attributed to lack of trust in institutions and social capital (Raiser, 1997, 1999).
Trust is favoured by past experiences, as proved by a cash-conditional game (Attanasio et al.,
2009). Interestingly, it looks like if there is some sort of asymmetry in the accumulation process of
trust: is hard to accrue but easy to lose (such as in the case of scandals - Zingales, 2012). However,
it is necessary to pay attention to the diﬀerence between personalized and generalized trust. Indeed,
personalized trust is a belief of trustworthiness regarding only certain people or groups (establishing
bonding social capital or strong ties) whether generalized trust refers to unknown people, thus to
the whole society (linking social capital). It follows that institutions and markets need generalized
trust, not personalized trust, which is essential for ensuring the financial development of a community
(Guiso et al., 2008c) while its lack could result in giving power to Mafia syndicates 3.
The role of migration
A particular note should be dedicated to migration, as a "‘carrier"’ of values and beliefs. Indeed,
migration is a promising field in order to understand social capital: migrants bring new values
and beliefs in the communities of incumbents. Understanding the characteristics of communities
assimilating migrants and which migrants preserve their cultural identity has interested several
scholars such as Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985) or Bisin and Verdier
(2001). Indeed, focusing on migrants, Luttmer and Singhal (2011) observe that preferences for
redistribution are aﬀected by the social preferences of the origin country, showing also persistence
across generations. Using data on European immigrants in the US, Giuliano (2007) attributes the
3"I don’t trust society to protect us, I have no intention of placing my fate in the hands of men whose only
qualification is that they managed to con a block of people to vote for them" says Michael Corleone, in The Godfather
- Puzo, 1969.
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diﬀerent living arrangements among young migrants to the sexual revolution of the 70s and its
diﬀerent impact across Europe. Algan and Cahuc (2010) exploit the values of second-generation
Americans as proxy of previous generations’ endowment, finding that trust has a significant causal
impact on economic activity, mainly through total factor productivity and accumulation of physical
and human capital. Fernandez et al. (2004) and Fernandez and Fogli (2009) point out to the role
of social capital in the fertility choices of American women.
LeSage and Ha (2012) consider how migration aﬀects social capital mainly through two channels:
either influencing the existing stock of trust and cooperation of natives or by importing migrants’
inherited social norms. Indeed, they underline how the relational nature of social capital often leads
researchers to consider it as place-based, hence, its measurement in terms of associational activity,
voting in elections and referenda, decennial census response rate, presence of tax-exempt non-profit
organizations. Thus, the role of migration seems reduced. On the other hand, migration may involve
members of a society with higher levels of human capital and higher propensity to participate in
social and civic organizations. If migrants maintain these attitudes even in the new country, they
are likely to aﬀect positively the social capital of their hosting community.
Geography may also play a role in terms of distance: if short-distance migration is consistent with
maintaining strong ties, on the opposite long-distance migration should imply weak ties. In terms of
trust, longer distance migration may also imply that the destination community is culturally more
distant making migrants less trusting. The opposite would be true for close-distance migration.
Empirical evidence in the US shows that it takes several generations for migrants to adapt to the
new set of values and beliefs of their new fatherland (Uslaner, 2008; Guiso et al., 2009). Moreover,
trusting attitudes against specific countries (and their citizens) are influenced by history of past
conflicts (Guiso et al., 2006). LeSage and Ha (2012) consider a social capital index, based on
associational density and civic participation, for US counties and apply spatial regression methods
to investigate the impact of migration on social capital. They find evidence of a positive eﬀect of
migration on social capital, concluding that that social capital cannot be considered just as place-
based. Aleksynska (2011) finds evidence of active participation by immigration, increasingly with
duration of speed. However, she finds that the speed of assimilation is diﬀerent for each group and,
for example, it is more diﬃcult for muslims. According to Luttmer and Singhal (2011), preferences
for redistribution are influenced by the receiving community/country.
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1.2.3 Confounding factors I: human capital and culture
Sometimes, to the extent social capital is interpreted as network, it has been dismissed on the grounds
of being overlapping with the concept of human capital. The problem of confounding factors,
specifically human capital, culture and institutions, is being discussed in the following. Indeed,
Cipolla (1974) states that at the heart of the diﬀerences between developed and less developed
countries lies the “human factor”:
"the problem of a less developed country (...) is the poor quality of the human factor: a less
developed country has worthless businessmen, workers that worth less, unqualified professors,
lazy students, policy-makers not able to rule and citizens without civicness. Thus the country
is less developed. The lack of capitals and technology and clerical backwardness are somehow
more consequences than causes4
Thus, the human factor is not human capital but some set of moral attitudes as clearly stated
by the use of moral adjectives (worthless, lazy). He later adds:
"education is an important element to increase the quality of human capital. But education
is not enough. For a working society requires the existence of some psychological and ethical
attributes, such as cooperation spirit, honesty, tolerance, sacrifice and entrepreneurial spirit,
perseverance and so on5."
As for education, the diﬀerences between culture and social capital are blurred. Both social
capital and culture capture values and beliefs, thus similar empirical counterparts. As a matter of
example, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) identify an eﬀect of adverse economic shocks (i.e. re-
cessions) on beliefs, with increased support for redistribution, more scope for luck (with respect to
4Original text in Italian: "Il guaio di un paese sottosviluppato non sta tanto nella mancanza di capitale o
nell’arretratezza delle conoscenze tecnologiche quanto nella povera qualità dei suo fattore umano: un Paese sot-
tosviluppato ha imprenditori che valgono poco, operai che valgono meno, professori incompetenti, studenti che studi-
ano poco, governanti che non sanno governare e cittadini senza senso civico. Per questo il Paese resta sottosviluppato.
La mancanza di capitali e l’arretratezza tecnologica e amministrativa in certo senso sono piu conseguenze che cause
del fenomeno dell’arretratezza."."
5Original text in Italian: L’istruzione é un elemento importante nel migliorare la qualità del capitale umano.
Ma l’istruzione non basta. Per il buon funzionamento di una società occorre la presenza di qualità psichiche ed
etiche, quali lo spirito di collaborazione, il senso di onestà, la tolleranza, lo spirito di sacrificio e di iniziativa, la
perseveranza, la curiosità intellettuale e sperimentale, ecc."
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eﬀort) and less trust in public institutions. However, this is related to individual cultural charac-
teristics, lacking the community dimension. Guiso et al. (2006) restrict culture to a specific set of
values and beliefs, provided that these are inherited from previous generations. This is indeed the
same identification strategy of Tabellini (2010) for whom culture and social capital are overlapping:
values and beliefs shared by communities, with a clear empirical counterpart and (dis)investment
process. Thus, in this specific context, culture and social capital are perfect substitutes. Moreover,
this definition of social capital/culture, focused on the intergeneration transmission of values, sheds
some light on the apparently great persistence of values and beliefs. Indeed, despite common sense
will likely dismiss the idea that something happened 500 years may still aﬀect current life, empirical
evidence (Guiso et al., 2008a) supports Putnam’s idea. A lively debate whether social capital is the
result of a long term accumulation process or not is under way: focusing on African regions which
have been heavily raided during the slave trade, Nunn and Wantchekon (2009) find that descendants
exhibit less trust in neighbours, relatives, and their local government. Guiso et al. (2008a) test Put-
nam’s hypothesis in Italy finding positive evidence that past free city experience in the Middle Ages
account for 50% of nowadays social capital gap between the North and the South Italy.
1.2.4 Confounding factors II: institutions
The relationship between social capital and institutions is a close one. Indeed beliefs, also defined
as mental models,
"are the internal representations that individual cognitive systems create to interpret the en-
vironment; institutions are the external (to the mind) mechanisms individuals create to structure
and order the environment." (North, 1990)
Similarities are not over: the concept of institutions is, unfortunately, as vague as that of social
capital:
"the human economy (. . . ) is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-
economic. The inclusion of the non-economic is vital. For religion or government may be as
important to the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the
availability of tools and machines themselves that lighten the toil of labour" (Polanyi et al.,
1957)
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Following North (1990), institutions may be considered as the rules of the game, a set of self-
imposed constraints with influences on any social, political and economic interactions. There is a
rich taxonomy regarding institutions: formal vs. informal, fast vs. slow changing, exogenous vs.
endogenous, political vs. economic, inclusive vs. extractive, and so on.
Indeed,while the idea of formal institutions is usually associated to the current set of laws and
norms, informal institutions belong to the broader set of social norms whose social capital may
be part of. Following Roland (2004), institutions may be classified according to their attitude to
change: slow and continuously changing institutions (such as values and beliefs) are opposed to
fast and irregularly changing ones (such as political institutions which may change even overnight).
Institutions may be exogenously given or endogenously generated, as a result of repeated games or
contingencies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). However, in both cases, institutions can’t be easily
enforced and are not a datum: democracy cannot be exported nor it can be taken for granted (e.g.
France and Napoleon); ineﬃcient institutions may survive for a long time because of vested interests
by specific lobbies or running elites: sometimes only an exogenous shock may induce a change (such
as the Glorious Revolution or the French Revolution did, respectively, in England and France) where
nothing was going to change. Finally, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) talk of inclusive economic
institutions that allow participation in economic activities, such as secured private property rights,
a fair legal system or no barriers to the entrance of new firms. It follows that to be inclusive, these
institutions should be available not just for an elite but for a broad base of citizens. Opposite
to these, such as in today’s North Korea or in the Latin America of the past century,economic
institutions are "extractive", because they allow a minority in power to extract income and wealth
from the majority (such as the "nomenklatura" in North Korea or the Spaniards in Latin America).
In the end, inclusive political and economic institutions work together:
"there is an intimate connection between economics and politics, that only certain combi-
nations of political and economic arrangements are possible, and that in particular, a society
which is socialist cannot also be democratic, in the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom"
(Friedman, 1962).
Indeed, the interactions between institutions seems complex but in reality it can be made easier
by focusing on the broader picture:
"institutional systems are generally not modular constructions where one module can be
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replaced easily by another. If this were so, institutional shopping would be nearly as easy as
supermarket shopping. Institutions generally form a system in the sense that each institution in
the system is complemented by others, achieving a certain systemic consistency. The existence
of complementarities among institutions suggests that analysts should examine systems of in-
stitutions, and that countries can be classified accordingly such as predatory vs development
systems" (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
However, it should be clear now, that formal rules are easy to change, whilst it takes longer
for informal/social norms changes, as they need to be shared voluntarily by the majority within
a community (Zingales, 2012), thus it is not so simple to export working informal institutions to
other countries. Education in southern states of the USA was eﬀectively restricted to whites due to
Jim Crow laws until mid ’60s, long after the abolition of slavery. Moreover, the same institution in
another country may not work because of the lack of other complements. Indeed,
"to the extent that the culture and local experiences had produced diverse institutions and
belief systems with respect to the gains from such cooperation, the likelihood of creating the
necessary institutions to capture the gains from trade of more complex contracting varied. In
fact most societies throughout history got stuck in an institutional matrix that did not evolve
into the impersonal exchange essential to capturing the productivity gains that came from the
specialization and division of labour that have produced the Wealth of Nations." (North, 1990)
Social capital and institutions intersect: Licht et al. (2007) report that countries which empha-
size values such as autonomy, egalitarianism and control over life, exhibit higher rule of law, less
corruption, and more democratic accountability. They use a very interesting instrumental variable,
focused on the use of personal pronouns in the languages: the compulsory use (such as in English),
suggests a cultural bias in favour of autonomy, whereas a language in which they can be omitted
suggests the opposite. According to Aghion et al. (2010) societies endowed with higher levels of trust
require lighter legal systems, while individuals from low trusting countries prefer higher regulation in
order to feel safer, even taking into account higher risks of corruption, leading to multiple equilibria.
Similarly, Pinotti (2011) observes that countries where opportunistic behaviour is frequent are more
likely to have tight regulations, even above the eﬃcient level. Knack and Keefer (1997) find that
social norms are stronger in countries with working formal institutions. Taken together, this implies
great diﬃculties in separating social capital from institutions.
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Institutions and growth
The role of institutions for economic growth, such as limits to the power of the executive or securing
property rights, is an old adagio:
"in all countries where there is tolerable security [of property], every man of common un-
derstanding will endeavour to employ whatever [capital] stock he can command . . . In those
unfortunate countries. . . where men are continually afraid of the violence of their superiors,
they frequently bury and conceal a great part of their [capital] stock. . . in case of their
being threatened with any of those disasters to which they consider themselves as at all times
exposed". (Smith, 1776)
Until recently, the neoclassical school initiated by Jevons and Walras, which developed an
institutions-free world, has been dominant (Alesina, 2006). Starting from the 90s instead, a new line
of research has been focusing on the eﬀect of institutions on economic growth. Nowadays, a lively
debate has started on how institutions work and aﬀect/are aﬀected by past and current economic
activity.
One (dominant) line of research may be summarized by the idea that historical institutions aﬀect
economic development, via current institutions, thus theorizing a legacy of history. Some authors
suggest that building institutions is a lengthy process (Hall and Jones, 1999), dating back to colonial
times (Acemoglu et al., 2001) or even to the first stages of urbanism (Cipolla, 1974; Putnam, 1993).
North (1993) remarks that institutions are resilient even to important exogenous and endogenous
shocks, such as revolutions or wars, at least in the short run while Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
say shocks are sometimes the only way to change. Building on the existing literature of comparative
economics (which traditionally compared socialism vs. capitalism), Djankov et al. (2003) suggest
the importance of the existing institutional framework, as
"government interventions that are appropriate in richer countries, which have high levels of
public accountability and transparency, may be inappropriate for the less developed economies".
Mauro and Pigliaru (2013) analyse public good provision and social capital: public money can
be captured by rent-seekers but with probability inversely proportional to the level of social capital
through the working of the local institutions. The diverted resources (iceberg costs) are aﬀected by
the control of the decision-making process: centralized decision making is influenced by the average
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level of social capital, while decentralized-decision making by local endowments of social capital.
Thus, in regions with higher endowments there would be less iceberg costs and viceversa. It follows
that heterogeneity in social capital drives economic divergence. Their model suggests a way to
mitigate the eﬀects of low endowments of social capital, through appropriate allocation of authority
between government levels (i.e. reduction of autonomy in communities poorly endowed of social
capital). Indeed, the process of decentralization in lagging regions causes the low levels of social
capital to become a binding constraint for growth, providing empirical evidence supporting the idea
that decentralization ended the convergence process. Moreover, there are serious concerns that vast
amounts of public funds in cities with low levels of social capital may become pray of vested interests
or even Mafia (Barone and Narciso, 2013). Thus, decentralization should proceed at diﬀerent speeds
across territories.
A slightly diﬀerent approach, suggested by Tabellini (2010), identifies a diﬀerent channel: his-
torical institutions aﬀects “culture”, defined as a narrow subset of values and beliefs, which in turns
shapes economic growth. Over the course of history social capital helped shaping not only formal
institutions at the national level, but also informal ones at the local or community level. In turn,
this process may help explaining diﬀerent economic outcomes even under the same current insti-
tutional framework, with interesting applications in regional sciences, as potential explanation of
regional divides. This theory attempts to explain the persistence of underdevelopment of some Eu-
ropean regions, controlling for the same national political and legal institutions, focusing on informal
institutions and weak rule of law.
1.3 Determinants of social capital and transmission models
"It is necessary to dismantle the rationality assumption underlying economic theory in order
to approach constructively the nature of human learning. History demonstrates that ideas,
ideologies, myths, dogmas, and prejudices matter"’ (North, 1993)
Traditional analysis of cultural transmission is based on evolutionary selection mechanisms,
which are based on genetic transmission, i.e. preferences are inherited from parents (Bisin and
Verdier, 2005). On the opposite side, an active role in the cultural transmission mechanisms, defined
as “socialization process”, transmitting values across generations, influencing personal beliefs and
values. This may happen through languages, customs, taboos, myths, providing cultural continuity
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via intergenerational transfer. Assuming reproduction success monotonically increasing in economic
pay-oﬀ, it follows a natural selection towards “dominant” cultural traits. However, the empirical
evidence of heterogeneous distribution of cultural traits in the population, suggests a diﬀerent story.
Indeed, albeit theories and models conjectured that in the US and some Western Europe countries a
“melting pot” was under way, the reality proved diﬀerent. Persistence of heterogeneous distribution
of cultural traits, even in second or more generations of immigrants is widely reported: Orthodox
Jews worldwide, Basques and Catalans in Spain, Quebecois in Canada and many more. Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) model a selection mechanism in which
there is a socialization process, either from parents (direct) or society (indirect). It follows that
the transmission of preferences, beliefs and norms, is the result of genetic evolution and social
interactions (also known as nature/nurture). The idea behind the cultural transmission mechanism
is that parents assess children’s actions and following outcomes, exerting some sort of socialization,
i.e. they instill those values they think are worthy. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Bisin and
Verdier (2001) parents’ assessment is imperfect, as they use their own preferences to select values and
beliefs (and forecasting the outcomes), not children’s ones. This filter is called imperfect empathy.
Indeed, as already suggested by North (1993),
"the rational choice framework assumes that individuals know what is in their self interest
and act accordingly. That may be correct for individuals making choices in the highly developed
markets of modern economies but it is patently false in making choices under conditions of
uncertainty - the conditions that have characterized the political and economic choices that
shaped (and continue to shape) historical change."
This could result for example in parents’ educating children to be over-confident or the opposite,
according to their personal experience. Indeed, as noted by Butler et al. (2010) "highly trustworthy
individuals tend to form overly optimistic beliefs, to assume too much social risk and to be cheated
more often", thus the importance of considering the role of indirect socialization. In what follows,
we will review some interesting models of cultural transmission.
1.3.1 Bisin and Verdier model
In several contributions Bisin and Verdier (2001, 2005, 2011), try to understand the conditions
inducing heterogeneity in the long run distribution of preferences in the population. Bisin and
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Verdier (2001) find that if direct socialization acts as cultural substitute for indirect socialization,
than a long run equilibrium with heterogeneous population is globally stable. Indeed, let’s consider
two cultural traits, i and j; families are made of one parent and one child (i.e. reproduction is
asexual); qi, is the share of individuals in the population of type i; finally, direct socialization occurs
with probability di(qi). The model assumes that if child is not directly socialized by his/her parents,
he/she picks the cultural trait of a random person from the population, which, according to the Law
of large numbers, occurs with probability equal to qi or 1   qi. Let’s define the probability for a
child from a family of type j of having cultural trait i, as P ij . Conversely, the probability of a child
from family type i to have cultural trait i as P ii. From what previously stated it follows that:
P ii = di(qi) +
⇥
1  di(qi)⇤ qi (1.1)
P ij =
⇥
1  di(qi)⇤ (1  qi) (1.2)
The rule that governs the dynamics of the population is:
q˙i = qi(1  qi) ⇥di(qi)  dj(1  qi)⇤ (1.3)
Under some specific conditions, it is possible to guarantee that the population will converge
to a globally stable and non-degenerate equilibrium (i.e. excluding the extremes 0 or 1), so that
heterogeneity of cultural traits is preserved. Moreover, the model allows a formal definition of
cultural substitution: direct and indirect socialization processes are cultural substitutes if di(qi) is
continuous and strictly decreasing in qi. Furthermore, di(1) = 0. Indeed, direct socialization eﬀort
of minorities will be greater than that of majorities (formally, di(0) > di(1)). Up to this point the
model assumes that parents’ contribution, through direct socialization, is exogenous: each parent
of group i exerts the same eﬀort and can’t determine the amount. Bisin and Verdier (2001) treats
also the endogenous case, whereas parents can decide the optimal level of eﬀort. Indeed, each agent
takes some economic and social decision, x, that maximizes its utility. The utility for parent of
type i of having a child of type j , is V ij , and it follows that each parent maximizes the following
expected utility:
ui(x) +
⇥
P iiV ii + P ijV ij
⇤
(1.4)
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Figure 1.1: Social spending/GDP vs. belief that luck determines income
Source: Alesina et al. (2001); Social spending/GDP on Y axis; belief on X axis
As previously stated, parents are able to anticipate, using their own utility function, the choice
a child with specific cultural trait will make (imperfect empathy). As a direct consequence, they
prefer their children to be socialized to their same cultural trait, or V ii > V ij , otherwise stated as
4V i = V ii   V ij > 0.
At this point we can introduce the production function of direct socialization as di = D(⌧ i, qi)
where ⌧ i is a vector of inputs (e.g. time spent with child, cultural homogeneity of the chosen
neighbourhood - see Patacchini and Zenou, 2007), with socialization incurring costs, C(⌧ i), so that
the agent maximizes the following expression w.r. to ⌧ i:
u(x)  C(⌧ i) + ⇥P iiV ii + P ijV ij⇤ (1.5)
The argmax is a continuous map di = d(qi,4V i). Bisin and Verdier (2001) prove that under
some regularity conditions (if @D(⌧
i,qi
@qi  0), then d(qi,4V i) satisfies the cultural substitution prop-
erty. Thus, the solution to the maximization problem guarantees cultural substitution and hence
heterogeneity in the cultural traits among the population in the long run.
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Table 1.1: The world in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales model
“honest” world “cheaters” world
prior prob=(⇡ˆ) (prior prob=1  ⇡ˆ)
% trustworthy individuals q1 q2
% cheaters 1  q1 1  q2
Source: Guiso et al. (2008a)
1.3.2 Benabou and Tirole model
An alternative way to frame emergence and persistence of collective beliefs is the model of Benabou
and Tirole (2006). The authors cross plot social spending (as percentage of GDP) against beliefs
of the role of luck in determining income (see figure 1.1): while the majority of Europeans believes
that luck is the main determinant of income rather than eﬀort, the opposite is true only for most of
the Americans.
This positive correlation between social spending and belief on the role of luck is the result
of rational choices according to Benabou and Tirole (2006), with 2 equilibria: a "european" and
an "american" one. Moreover, several psychologists and sociologists have documented the need of
many individuals to believe in a just world, where eﬀort is rewarded, despite empirical evidence
providing the opposite (a phenomenon known in psychological literature as cognitive dissonance).
This belief in the willpower has important eﬀects on the support of redistributive policies in the
US: "the general view (is) that success is a triumph of the will and a reflection of ability" (Lane,
1959). This idea is well known in the psychological literature as the “fundamental attribution error”
or illusion of control, i.e. the tendency to explain any events excluding luck or circumstances, as if
life was totally under one’s control (at least in the US).
Indeed, according to the authors, beliefs about the role of luck might be the result of three
processes: “horizontal”, “top-down” (capitalists brainwashing workers) and “bottom-up” (the authors’
prospective).
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Figure 1.2: Timing of Benabou and Tirole model
Source: Benabou and Tirole (2006)
Figure 1.3: Timing of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales model
Source: Guiso et al. (2008a)
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1.3.3 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales model
Guiso et al. (2008a) start from Putnam’s paradox, i.e. the high persistence of social capital across
centuries.The authors provide empirical evidence in support of this paradox while their model ex-
plains values persistence through an overlapping-generations setting. The economy has two types
of agents, trustworthy and non-trustworthy. As there is uncertainty on the share of both types of
individuals, each agent has a prior on the distribution. Indeed, with prior probability ⇡ˆ, the agent
lives in a world where the share of trustworthy agents, q1 is the majority, whereas with probability
1   ⇡ˆ in a world where non-trustworthy are the majority, with trustworthy being a share q2 of
population with 0  q2 < 1/2. Thus, we have two environments/worlds, (see table 1.1), an “honest”
world, where trustworthy individuals are the majority, and a “cheaters” world where cheaters are
the majority.
The model is an overlapping generation model where every agent lives 3 periods (see figure 1.3):
in the first, she receives priors from her parents (ignoring indirect socialization); then in period 1
she can invest her whole endowment (the investment can’t be fractioned), x, in a trust game (Fehr
et al., 2003) where the amount she obtains is influenced by an independent player, the receiver. She
either receives Rx, with R   1, a positive return, or Lx, with L ⌧ 1, a loss. After she observes
the outcome she updates her prior and transmits the updated prior to her child. Parents transmit
conservative priors to their children because they do not weight the future the same way as their
children do. To this extent, the model does not coincide with an infinitely living agent model. She
faces another investment choice in period 2, after which she dies. The model assumes that after
the investment, the agent knows perfectly whether the share of trustworthy individuals is q1 or q2.
It follows that if in period 1 she does not invest, she will not be aware of the share of trustworthy
individuals, thus she will not invest even in period 2. If the receiver is drawn from the “honest”
world, the expected return from the investment is A = q1R + (1   q1)L whereas if the receiver is
a “cheater”, the return is B = q2R + (1   q2)L. It follows that the pay-oﬀ for the first period is
⇡ˆAx+ (1  ⇡ˆ)Bx and, considering that each period she can invest twice the initial endowment (or
save both if she decides not to invest), the net expected pay-oﬀ from investing over the two periods
will be
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P (⇡ˆ, R, L, q1, q2) = 2 [⇡ˆAx+ (1  ⇡ˆ)Bx]  2x
The authors show that there exists a value of ⇡ˆ, the prior distribution,m, defined by
P (m,R,L, q1, q2) = 0,
such that she will invest if and only if
⇡ˆ   m(R,L, q1, q2).
The model defines the optimal prior that parents will instill in their children. Indeed, denoting
with ⇡ the parents’ updated prior about the state of the world, the child net expected utility from
investing in one period, as perceived by her parents, is
Pp(⇡, R, L, q1, q2) = ⇡Ax+ (1  ⇡)Bx  x
The parent will be indiﬀerent about her child choices if his prior, ⇡ , will be equal to mp, defined
by
Pp(mp, R, L, q1, q2) = 0.
Eventually, the teaching strategy will be8><>:⇡ˆ   mp if ⇡   mp⇡ˆ  mp if ⇡ < mp
i.e., if ⇡   mp, he will transmit a prior that is as optimistic as his (⇡ˆ) and viceversa. In the other
case, his child will not invest, transmitting this unfavourable prior to the next generation, ending
in a "no trust-no trade” equilibrium, a pessimist trap for the society. To this extent, the model
explains the path dependency of social capital, accounting for Putnam’s puzzle. A positive shock to
the benefits of cooperation may help escaping the pessimist trap having permanent eﬀects, although,
according to the authors, it takes at least 2/3 generations to be eﬀective. This also explains why
second generations immigrants preserve their ancestors beliefs and values (it takes time to modify
their priors). One of the key problems with the model is that it ignores indirect socialization.
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Table 1.2: Prisoner’s dilemma in Tabellini’s model
C NC
C c, c h  l, c+ w
NC c+ w, h  l h, h
Source: Tabellini (2008b)
Moreover, the learning process is discrete (either you invest or not) and can happen just twice:
smaller investments, as it happens in reality dealing with someone the first time, will increase the
speed of learning and reduce the cost of making wrong choices.
1.3.4 Tabellini’s model
Why people cooperate? The traditional answer is reputation: incentives to cooperate are linked to
repeated games and temptation to cheat, the higher the benefits from repeated games, which re-
quire sustained cooperation, the lower the probability of deviation/cheating and viceversa. Tabellini
(2008b) argues that the traditional approach ignores people whose behaviour internalize specific so-
cial norms. Thus, the problem becomes to identify the origin of values and beliefs and transmission
models. Using standard tools in economics (namely individual optimization and equilibrium anal-
ysis), he focuses on values’ endogenous evolution and their interaction with economic incentives.
Adapting a model previously defined by Dixit (2007), individuals are randomly matched with oth-
ers to play a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, excluding repetitions and so the role of reputation.
It follows that cooperation might be sustained also by values, not only reputation. Building on
Banfield (1958) and his “amoral familism” concept, he distinguishes between limited and generalized
morality, i.e. social norms that apply only to close/strong ties (such as their own kind) vs. norms
that apply to all. In this respect, generalized morality sustains cooperation over a larger range of
situations (e.g. generalized trust, required in order to sustain financial transaction - see Guiso et
al., 2004). In order to model cultural transmission, Tabellini builds on Bisin and Verdier (2001),
assuming imperfect empathy, thus equilibrium is both backward (because parents’ values influence
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children education) and forward looking (because parents adapt their educational choices according
to expectations of their future environment). This model also points out a particular role of space:
indeed, generalized morality is hurt by local enforcement of cooperation and weaker with more dis-
tant transactions. To this extent, good legal institutions, protecting unrelated individuals, breed
good values. There is a continuum of one-period living agents uniformly distributed on a circle of
diameter S, the maximum distance between two agents; each individual is randomly matched with
probability g(y) , where y is the distance (geographical but also socio-economical such as religion,
ethnicity, education..). When two agents are matched, they play a prisoner’s dilemma game as
indicated in table 1.2, where c > h, w > 0 and l   w. When both agents play cooperatively, they
both get c, while in case of deviations, the non-cooperative player takes c+w while the cooperative
takes less (h   l). Up to now, this is standard economic incentive based mechanism. However,
the author assumes a non-economic pay-oﬀ granted to the cooperative player, irrespective of what
the other agents play (e.g. moral-religious benefit of playing C), d, which decays with distance y
according to a parameter ✓; thus the non-economic benefit, de ✓y , is greater within a circle of
connected individuals. There are two types of players (“trustworthy” and “not trustworthy”) which
diﬀer according to the decay of the non-economic benefit; indeed, not trustworthy individuals have
parameter ✓0 > ✓1, so non-economic benefit decays faster. In the first part of the model the share
of trustworthy individuals, n, is exogenously determined () but it is later treated as endogenous.
Denoting with ⇡(y) the probability that the other agent will play cooperatively, the net expected
material benefit from playing NC is
T (⇡(y)) = [l   ⇡(y)(l   w)] > 0 (1.6)
Notably, if l > w, the net material benefit is strictly decreasing in ⇡(y) , i.e. if you cheat (⇡(y)
decreasing), I cheat (T (⇡(y))), the net benefit from playing NC, increases). Thus, the game entails
strategic complementarity while assuming the opposite, w > l, it would have been strategic sub-
stitution. This holds for anybody, but cooperative agents compare T(⇡(y)) with the non-economic
pay-oﬀ de ✓y. Thus, the agent will be in equilibrium if T (⇡(y¯k)) = de ✓y¯
k
, i.e. there is a threshold,
y¯k =
 
ln {d}  ln[(w   l)⇡(y¯k) + l] /✓k
such that (considering that de ✓y is decreasing in y),
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8><>:T (⇡(y¯
k)) < de ✓y¯
k
(play C) if y < y¯k
T (⇡(y¯k)) > de ✓y¯
k
(play NC) if y > y¯k.
In the extreme case of a “bad” agent (✓0), sure that his/her opponent will always cooperate
(⇡(y) = 1), there would be a certain threshold, Y 0, such that until the distance is Y < Y 0 he will
cooperate; the good player realizes that the bad player will cooperate up to that distance and plays
C until Y 0, NC otherwise. The “good” agent instead knows that up to Y < Y 0 bad will play C,
while for Y > Y 0 it depends on the share of good individuals in society, n. It follows that a good
player cooperates up to y¯1 = {ln {d}  ln[(w   l)n+ l]} /✓1. As Y 0 might be smaller or greater
than y¯1, it follows that the upper threshold for the good player is given by
Y 1 = max(y¯1, Y 0).
The model has some simple implications:
1. cooperation is easier to sustain if players are “close”, which results not from repeated games
(indeed, game is one-shot) but from internalization of norms of good conduct;
2. a more heterogeneous society (i.e. the larger the diameter S) implies less frequent cooperation.
It can be noticed that Y 0 rises if benefits of cheating (w) falls, if non economic benefit of
cooperation rises and if norms of good conduct decay more slowly (such as with good agent). Y 1
depends on the same variables but it also decreases if l, the loss from being cheated, increases, and
it increases with the share of good agents, n. This is a result of imperfect information and reflects
strategic complementarity: individuals are more willing to cooperate the higher the probability they
will be matched with good agents. Moreover, w and l, the reward from cheating and loss from being
cheated respectively, depend on institutions: better enforcement reduces benefits from cheating
and reduces loss from being cheated, resulting in higher values of Y 0 and Y 1 i.e. larger scope for
cooperation. In the second part, Tabellini models the endogenous evolution of the share of “good”
agents, which was previously assumed to be fixed. Individuals live two periods: in the first, they
acquire education by their parents and play the trust game as before. In the second period, they
become lone parents and they spend all the time educating their child, a costly activity (with costs
assumed to be a quadratic cost function, (1/2')f2, where f is parent’s eﬀort and ' is a measure
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of the rate of marginal costs. The probability that a child becomes good is equal to   + f , with
0 <   < 1 randomly determined, i.e. the parent is not fully in charge of determining the type of
child he will have. The values transmitted will be assessed through the parent’s eyes (imperfect
empathy). After the education process is completed, the child observes his own type and plays the
trust game. Let V pkt be the expected utility in equilibrium of child k type as assessed by his parent
p, or:
V pkt = U
k
t + d
Y ktZ
0
e ✓
pzg(z)dz (1.7)
where Ukt is the material pay-oﬀ of type k child, and the other expression is the non-economic
pay-oﬀ, as evaluated by the parent, ✓p. If the values of the kid coincide with those of the parent
(which happens with probability equal to  +f), then the relevant threshold is the same, Y kt . Indeed,
Tabellini proves a Lemma stating that a parent always prefers to have a child with his same values
(V ppt   V pkt ). As education is costly, only good parents exert the eﬀort while the bad parents exert
no eﬀort at all. It follows that the fraction of good players at time t, nt, is
nt = nt 1(  + f) + (1  nt 1)  =   + nt 1f
The optimal choice of eﬀort is calculated comparing the marginal costs of education to the
expected net marginal benefits of eﬀort, or
f/' = (U1t   U0t ) + d
Z Y1t
Y 0
e ✓
1zg(z)dz (1.8)
The parent perceives a trade-oﬀ between the (negative) material pay-oﬀ and the (positive) non-
economic pay-oﬀ. Overall, the net benefits exceed the costs, thus the eﬀort is positive. Moreover,
f = F (Y 1t ) is strictly increasing in Y 1t , i.e. if scope of cooperation (as captured by Y 1t ) increases,
so does the eﬀort, entailing a (second) strategic complementarity: when parents anticipate other
parents are investing more in education, the scope of cooperation increases and so they exert more
eﬀort (a self fulfilling prophecy). An interesting result arises when we focus on external enforcement
(which increases the scope of cooperation), particularly on the share of good agents; indeed previous
literature found that better external enforcement (i.e. better formal institutions) hurt informal
institutions, weakening reputation. Tabellini, which focuses on values, not on reputation, finds a
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diﬀerent result, modelling better enforcement as higher probability of detecting cheating (1  q(y))
thus reducing the gains from cheating and the loss from being cheated. Indeed, better distant
enforcement (i.e. formal institutions) increases the scope of cooperation leading parents to exert
more eﬀort (as the environment improves), so better enforcement contributes to the diﬀusion of good
values, or, there is strategic complementarity, not substitution as previously stated. On the opposite
side, better local enforcement (i.e. informal institutions such as reputation) reduces the scope for
education, destroying good values. Thus, while an increase in law enforcement induces higher
investments in education and diﬀusion of generalized morality, improvements in local enforcement
reduces it, especially in the presence of weak formal institutions, something that explains the path-
dependence of Southern Italy (where feudalism was abolished in the 19th century).
1.4 Wrap up of the chapter
In section 1.1 we summarized the literature concerning social capital, starting from its definitions
across sociology, political science and economics: in sociology is perceived either as a personal re-
source or in terms of ties and networks (bonding, bridging and linking - see Rutten et al. 2010); in
political science is the idea of amoral familism and civicness introduced by Banfield (1958), Putnam
(1993) and Fukuyama (1995), focusing on values and beliefs favouring cooperation and account-
ability; economists have long ignored the concept up to the 90s, likely because of the diﬃculties of
integration into standard theoretical frameworks (Manski, 2000), with the notable exception of a
particular facet, trust, which can easily be incorporated in standard models. The main problem of
social capital, its definition, is the subject of section 1.1.2 where we build on the contribution of
Solow (1995) whose suggestion of two requirements represents a turning point in the debate; these
suggestions are: a well defined investment/depreciation process and a clear measurable empirical
counterpart. Taken at face value, Guiso et al. (2011) elaborate the concept of “civic capital” as
"those persistent values and shared beliefs, which allow a group to overcome the free rider problem
in the pursuit of socially valuable activities", which should be robust to the main criticisms.
In section 1.2 we investigate the channels through which social capital aﬀects economic growth.
A decisive role is given to trust, particularly relevant when transactions involve some unknown
counterpart, when the transaction takes place over a period of time rather than being completed on
the spot, and when the legal protection is imperfect. However, it is necessary to pay attention to
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the diﬀerence between personalized and generalized trust, as the former is a belief of trustworthi-
ness regarding only certain people or groups whether generalized trust refers to the whole society.
Geography may also play a role in terms of distance: if short-distance migration is consistent with
maintaining strong ties, on the opposite, long-distance migration should imply weak ties. This has
repercussions on social capital as longer distance migration may also imply that the destination
community is culturally more distant making migrants less trusting. There are serious issue in the
identification of social capital due to the presence of specific confounding factors, namely human
capital, culture and institutions which are analysed and discussed in sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4. In-
deed only if culture is defined as values and beliefs shared by communities, with a clear empirical
counterpart and (dis)investment process, it can be considered a perfect substitute of social capital
while the relationship between social capital and institutions is a close one. Following North (1990),
institutions may be considered the rules of the game, self-imposed constraints with influences on
any social, political and economical interactions.
Building on this definition we present (see section 1.3) four models of cultural transmission by
Bisin and Verdier (2001, 2005, 2011), introducing the concept of direct and indirect socialization,
i.e. the influence of parents and environment in defining children’s values, and imperfect empathy,
i.e. parents’ assessment of children’s welfare through their own view. Benabou and Tirole (2006)
frame a model on values composition and transmission where two equilibria exist: a "European"
one where luck is perceived as determinant to income and an "American" one where the opposite
is true, influencing policy-maker on welfare allocation. Starting from Putnam’s claim that on the
persistence of social capital, Guiso et al. (2008a)’s model suggest a way parents’ imperfect empathy
might result in a pessimistic trap of no generalized trust nor trade for generations, consistently with
Putnam’s claim. Finally, Tabellini (2008b) builds a model where cooperation is fostered by values
and beliefs, not reputation, which are transmitted and nurtured according to geographical distance.
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Chapter 2
Measuring social capital
Once narrowed down the definition of social capital, there are still several problems related to
its measurement, as remarked by Fukuyama (2000): "one of the greatest weaknesses of the social
capital concept is the absence of consensus on how to measure it". Sestito (2011) states that it is
not possible to get satisfaction with an idea of social capital as "intangible when present, necessary
when it is not present”. Indeed, facing the profusion of empirical measures of social capital, there is
the need for a reasoned overview of the existing measures (section 2.1). A particular attention will
be dedicated to the link between space and social capital (section 2.2) and to the necessary tools
of spatial statistics and econometrics. Finally, to the extent social capital is a multidimensional
concept, Principal component analysis, a way to handle complex datasets, is discussed in section
2.3.
2.1 Available measures
At the end of 90s the World Bank launched a Social Capital Thematic Group (Dasgupta and
Serageldin, 1999) which, starting from the idea that the complexity of social capital cannot be
fully represented by one single variable, broke it down to five dimensions, with their correspondent
empirical counterparts:
1. groups and networks - collections of individuals that promote and protect personal relation-
ships improving welfare;
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2. trust and solidarity - elements of interpersonal behaviour which fosters greater cohesion and
more robust collective action;
3. collective action and cooperation - ability of people to work together toward resolving com-
munal issues;
4. social cohesion and inclusion - mitigates the risk of conflict and promotes equitable access to
benefits of development by enhancing participation of the marginalized;
5. information and communication - breaks down negative social capital and also enables positive
social capital by improving access to information.
Righi and Scalise (2013) distinguish between a structural component of social capital (e.g density
of civic associations, voter turnout), and a cognitive component, measured by values and beliefs.
While the former is quantitative and easily estimated, the latter is more qualitative and complicated
to measure. This approach is rich and detailed but requires either a multivariate regression or the
use of synthetic indicators (such as principal components or factor analysis). In the following, we
will review three categories of available empirical measures: survey data, experiments and outcome
based measures.
2.1.1 Survey data
Surveys attempt to measure directly those values (such as tolerance, respect for others, autonomy)
and beliefs (such as trustworthiness or fairness) that are shared voluntarily by the majority of
the community (Zingales, 2012). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001),Durlauf (2002) and Guiso et
al. (2011) advocate greater use of experiments and survey data as a better route to increase our
understanding of social capital.
Along these lines, Tabellini (2010) extracts the principal components from four measures of
values and beliefs of the World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Study (EVS); Tabellini
(2008a) uses the US General Social Survey (GSS) to study the trusting attitudes of third-generation
immigrants; Albanese et al. (2013) use Banca d’Italia Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) to study generalized and personalized trust where the former is traditionally measured
using the following question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?". The same question has been maintained
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intact across many surveys, such as the World Value Survey, the European Value Study or the
European Social Survey (ESS) As for the answers, with some exceptions, they are usually binary:
either ’Most people can be trusted’ or ’Need to be very careful’. It follows that the share of people
answering ’Most people can be trusted’ is usually taken as a measure of generalized trust in the
population, although the intensity of the belief is missed. However, the ESS and Banca d’Italia
SHIW allow a 10 points range of possible answers to the same question, with ’Most people can be
trusted’ or ’Need to be very careful’ at the extremes.
The European Commission Eurobarometer (EB) collects information about trusting and trust-
worthiness used by, among others, Guiso et al. (2009), who find positive correlation in the nordic
countries. In Italy, the Indagine multiscopo led by Istat has several interesting questions used by
Righi and Scalise (2013) and Albanese et al. (2013). A legitimate doubt about people’s comprehen-
sion of the trust question has been tested in the 2003 Dutch National Bank Household survey which
posed the following experimental question:
"Suppose that a random person you do not know personally receives by mistake a sum of 1000
euros that belong to you. He or she is aware that the money belongs to you and knows your name
and address. He or she can keep the money without incurring in any punishment. According to
you what is the probability (a number between zero and 100) that he or she returns the money."
The results show positive correlation between the experimental and the survey question, thus re-
ducing this problem. The validity and reliability of the trust question has been objected (Reeskens
and Hooghe, 2008) on the grounds of being:
1. rather imprecise (the respondents have the choice between trust and caution and not between
trust and distrust or between cautious and incautious behaviour);
2. that the possible answers are not mutually exclusive;
3. that only one item is not considered to be a reliable measure (Yamagishi et al., 1999; Glaeser
et al., 2000).
Naef and Schupp (2009) take into account these criticisms defining a new measure of trust,
extracting the principal components of the answers to the following four statements:1
1The possible answers on a four point rating scale to the first two statements were "disagree strongly", "disagree
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1. "in general, you can trust people;"
2. "nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody;"
3. "how much do you trust strangers you meet for the first time;"
4. "when dealing with strangers, it’s better to be cautious before trusting."
Other important issues should be considered using survey data: the ordering and number of
questions matters (people try to be consistent over the answered questions but they can also be tired
with long surveys), as well as the chosen wording. Moreover, there are issues of social desirability
and cognitive dissonance. Indeed, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) suggest to avoid using survey
data directly as dependent variable, but only as explanatory variable. Moreover, as pointed out by
Faiella (2010),
"many statistical methods are developed assuming that sample information comes from a
population model where the sampling scheme plays no role."
To this extent, the European Social Survey administrators spent a considerable amount of time
and eﬀort to define proper design eﬀects and weights. The former are a measure of the departure
of the survey design with respect to Simple Random Sampling (SRS). Design eﬀects are instead
crucial in order to ensure precision of the estimators, especially in case of cross country survey. For
example, in some countries there are complete population registers, so that researches can draw a
sample directly, while in other countries this is not possible, paving the way to multi-stage sample
designs. If all the elements of the population have the same probability of inclusion and the sample
size is fixed, then the unweighted estimator of a mean is unbiased. However, this is far from being
usual, as units in the sample usually have unequal probability of inclusion. Indeed, statisticians
correct for this possible source of bias using a sampling weight for each observation, usually the
inverse of the sampling fraction. Moreover, the rate of non-responses and auxiliary information
about the population, such as newer estimates of the percentage of adult population, are all ex post
considered in a process known as calibration. Finally, the use of techniques such as clustering or
stratification could lead to inaccurate estimation of the variance. The impact of these three factors
somewhat", "agree somewhat", or "agree strongly"; "no trust at all", "little trust", "quite a bit of trust", and "a lot
of trust" for the third question and "disagree strongly", "disagree somewhat", "agree somewhat", or "agree strongly"
for the last question.
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(weighting, clustering and stratification) lead to diﬀerent results and it should be clearly understood
by a careful analysis of the survey documentation.
2.1.2 Experiments
Experiments are another way to directly measure values and beliefs, as in the case of the sender-
receiver game to study trust and reciprocity (Berg et al., 1995). Using two experiments and survey
data, Glaeser et al. (2000) find that trustworthiness is strongly predicted by attitudinal survey
questions about trust (not trustworthiness), while experimental measure of trust is not predicted by
standard survey questions but by past behaviour (they suggest to ask specific questions about past
behaviour). Cassar and Wydick (2010) carry out a rare cross country exercise, with experiments
involving 1554 participants in Armenia, Guatemala, Kenya, India, and the Philippines, finding
that societal trust positively and significantly influences group loan contribution rates. Naef and
Schupp (2009) provide a review of studies which confirm the finding of Glaeser et al. (2000), i.e.
that the standard trust question is not correlated with trusting behaviour, together with several
papers finding the opposite. Fehr (2009) underlines the connection between survey measures of
trust and altruistic behaviours, via preferences and expectations: I behave altruistically whether
I’m confident I will not be the only one. Indeed, people fear more to be cheated than to be unlucky,
something known as "betrayal aversion" (Bohnet et al., 2008). One of the main advantages of
experiments derives from imposing a well-defined structure, facilitating interpretations and reducing
measurement errors and bias, which can also be made incentive compatible. The main troubles with
this approach is the lack of external validity as samples are generally not representative: usually
they are made of graduate students, behaving diﬀerently from non-students, or even economics
students who behave diﬀerently from other students. Particularly, according to Naef and Schupp
(2009) students are more trusting than non-students. Eventually also experiments may suﬀer from
the desire to please the experimenters (Levitt and List, 2007).
2.1.3 Outcome based measures
Another approach to measure social capital is based on indirect estimation by observing its eﬀects.
For example, studying Italy, Putnam (1993) uses the number of voluntary associations, newspaper
readers, tax compliance, littering and queuing as proxy of social capital; Ichino and Maggi (2000)
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use absenteeism rate in a large Italian bank while Licht et al. (2007) use a linguistic variable.
Focusing on NUTS-3 regions in Italy (so called "province") Guiso et al. (2004, 2009) use blood and
organs donations as extreme measures of valuing common good (since there is no compensation).
Fisman and Miguel (2006) use parking violations by United Nations oﬃcials (who are protected by
diplomatic immunity) in New York. Several authors use voter turnout albeit Sestito (2011) suggests
to use referenda, as higher voter turnout might be the result of pork barrel politics. A promising
field relates to the use of information stored in social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter), which could
provide easy and cheap access to a sound map of social interactions. Unfortunately, these data are
hardly accessible.
One of the main advantages of outcome based measures are the availability of long time series (e.g.
voter turnout), across country and spatial representativeness at sub national level. Unfortunately,
there are also serious issues of endogeneity ("social capital becomes tautologically present whenever a
good outcome is observed" Durlauf 1999) and/or measurement errors. Indeed, in order to be a good
proxy of social capital, the outcome measures and social capital should have a stable relationship,
unaﬀected by other factors.
2.2 Social capital, space and spatial econometrics
2.2.1 Social capital and space
The traditional utility/profit maximization approach is a-spatial ("A merchant, it has been said
very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country" - Smith, 1776). However,
several authors point to the role of spatial agglomeration in spurring development. Cipolla (1974)
stresses the role of cities in the 11th century: up to that point, people looked for protection under
feudalism. On the contrary, thanks to urbanism, people started to develop groups and associations
in order to self protect against tyranny, increasing their revenue and leading the way to the creation
of a middle class. Guiso et al. (2008b) find evidence that the further from the sea or being at the
crossroad of Roman roads, the higher the values of social capital. Moreover, under the assumption
that the determinants of location advantages are the same in the North, Center and South, they
identify a set of southern Italian cities which would have likely been independent, if there were not
the Normans. Then, they compare the level of social capital (as measured by the number of no-profit
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associations, referenda turnout and organs donations) of free city states in the Center-North and
potential free city states in the South, using the diﬀerence in social capital between not free cities
in the Center-North and unlikely free city states in the South as a control for generic diﬀerences
between North and South. A likely-independent city in the South has 35 percent less social capital
than a free city of the North, vindicating Putnam’s conjecture. Almost half of the gap in social
capital between North and South is thus explained by the lack of the free city experience. In German
there is a specific word,"volksgemeinschaft", which specifies the situation when people feel a sense of
"in-group" commonality with their countrymen. To the extent that the formation of cultural traits
will depend on human interactions, the strength of these ties will depend on transaction costs, which
are typically increasing with distance. As a consequence, since social relations are spatially sticky,
so are norms and values. Rutten et al. (2010) for example, underline how agglomeration forces also
imply a concentration of people with more similar cultural traits. Moreover, they underline how
maintaining ties over long distances requires large benefits over time. Ties at shorter distances can be
maintained in the presence of smaller benefits, so that proximity should imply denser social relations
and transmission of cultural values. Interestingly, they also note how the spatial dimension of social
capital requires consideration for both space and time. The relationship between space and social
capital can occur in a horizontal continuous space marked by distance, a horizontal discontinuous
space marked by borders and a hierarchical space with discontinuities due to multiple levels of
markets and governance. This particular interpretation allows a role for geography in mapping
values and beliefs across communities as a function of proximity. Hence, the importance to assess
the relationship between space and cultural ties, monitoring this relationship over time and being
reminiscent of the first law of geography: “everything is related to everything else, but near things
are more related than distant things” (Tobler, 1970).
Barriers and discontinuities should promote bonding social capital but limit the formation of
bridging social capital. The existence of hierarchies should imply that the civic capital of a commu-
nity may depend on the influence of international, national and regional factors. After all, trust is
a community value:
"it is necessary not only to trust others before acting cooperatively, but also to believe that
one is trusted by others.” (Gambetta, 1988)
de Dominicis et al. (2013) construct a measure of social capital extracting the principal compo-
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nent of indicators of opinion leadership, daily newspaper readership, life satisfaction and trust taken
from the Eurobarometer. They find evidence that both social capital and geographical proximity
are important determinants of European regions innovative output. Basile et al. (2012) instead find
empirical evidence of the importance of social proximity for knowledge spillovers.
2.2.2 Space and measurement
Thirty years ago countries were considered the unit of reference in cross section analysis. Better
sampling methods and costs’ reduction in data collection made easier access to data at sub national
levels. This richness obliged researchers to face the problem of within country variability as they
face several administrative divisions and the choice of the spatial unit is often arbitrary (but not
indiﬀerent). The seminal paper by Gehlke and Biehl (1934) reports diﬀerences in correlation coeﬃ-
cients conditional on the spatial unit used. Indeed, there is diﬀerence whether we consider the same
variable at country, regional, city or even neighborhood level especially as we are focusing on social
interactions and ties. To this extent, we should be aware of the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
(MAUP),
"a challenge that occurs during spatial analysis of aggregated data in which the results diﬀer
when the same analysis is applied to the same data, but diﬀerent aggregation schemes are used"
(ESRI, GIS dictionary).
As observed by Openshaw and Taylor (1979) and Openshaw (1984), MAUP refers to two distinct
problems, namely, scale and shape. The former appears whether variation in results is obtained just
by simply aggregating the units of observations in larger units (e.g. cities in regions, regions in
countries) and viceversa. The shape problem instead refers to any situations whenever, given the
number of units, variation arises simply changing the way units are grouped (i.e. the shape). So
the MAUP relates to the identification of the “right” number of units or the aggregation we need to
perform our analysis. As remarked by Menon (2012), is
"the whole process of taking points on a map and allocating them to units in a box, that
is arbitrary and likely to introduce a spurious component in the results. This happens because
our boxes are generally not regular nor homogeneous in both shape and size. Furthermore, in
the process we lose all the spatial information embedded in the data, and distance is collapsed
to a binary variable in/out."
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Figure 2.1: Example of functional area: Core Based Statistical Areas in the US
Source: Menon (2012)
This problem can be solved through theory, considering whether the phenomenon we are observ-
ing has some economic sense at that territorial level. Evidence provided by Briant et al. (2010) in
France seems to suggest that the MAUP induces smaller distortions than misspecification. There
has been a considerable eﬀort by national statistical agencies in order to define functional regions,
areas that capture a local labour market beyond the existing administrative boundaries, which can
solve any problems related to MAUP. In UK there are the "travel to work areas" ; in Italy the "sis-
temi locali del lavoro" ; in France the "zones d emploi" while in the US there are the "Core Based
Statistical Areas" (CBSAs - see figure 2.1).
Sample size and spatial data
An important issue when using data at disaggregated spatial level is the sample size. Indeed, most
of the time, surveys were not designed to perform inference at sub national level (and sometimes
even to infer more than simple frequency or average values). This is potentially a serious issue with
respect to social capital. Indeed, in order to gauge the eﬀect of MAUP on the survey data commonly
used, we reviewed all the attached documentation of the European Social Survey, looking for the
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maximum territorial level (referring to Eurostat’ NUTS coding2) at which we can correctly make
statistical inference. Indeed the first two waves (2002 and 2004) do not provide this information
thus we report only the maximum territorial disaggregation available (e.g. data for Czech Republic
in 2002 was available at NUTS 1, 2 and 3 level, so we report “3” - see table 2.1). Starting from
the third wave (2006), the documentation also indicates the maximum disaggregated level to make
significant inference. We report this level, indicated by a star. We summarized all these pieces of
information in column "Mixed" where we suggest the territorial level that should be considered in
order to use all the waves for a specific country. We extract some standard measures of values and
beliefs associated to social capital (namely, generalized trust, both from the European Value Study
and the European Social Survey, control over life, obedience and respect) and we compute Global
Moran’s I, the standard measure of spatial autocorrelation, under 3 spatial regimes: NUTS 1, NUTS
2 and our "Mixed" (see table 2.2). As we can see, with respect to spatial autocorrelation, it seems
there is no particular diﬀerence between using data at NUTS 2 level or our "Mixed" measure. This
is an important result as it suggests that, with respect to the spatial correlation, we could easily
approximate our estimations using data at NUTS 2 level, reducing the MAUP.
2.2.3 A brief introduction to the relevant Spatial Statistics and Econometrics methods
Spatial statistics toolbox
We introduce some basic tools of spatial analysis, precisely Exploratory space data analysis (ESDA)
techniques, starting from the definition of the weighting matrix Wi,j as
Wi,j =
8><>:1 if i and j are contiguous0 otherwise
In particular, let’s consider Global Moran’s I (Anselin, 1993), a measure of spatial correlation:
2In Europe, Eurostat, the European Commission statistical agency, has divided the territory of the EU in a
hierarchical system, calledNomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). The current NUTS classification
valid from 1st January 2012 until 31th December 2014 lists 97 NUTS 1 regions, 270 NUTS 2 regions and 1294 NUTS
3 regions.
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Table 2.2: Global spatial autocorrelation by NUTS level
1999 2008
Variable name Mixed NUTS 1 NUTS 2 Mixed NUTS 1 NUTS 2
G. Trust (EVS) 0, 67⇤⇤⇤ 0, 44⇤⇤⇤ 0, 63⇤⇤⇤ 0, 51⇤⇤⇤ 0, 17⇤⇤ 0, 51⇤⇤⇤
G. Trust (ESS) 0, 68⇤⇤⇤ 0, 13⇤ 0, 66⇤⇤⇤ 0, 71⇤⇤⇤ 0, 43⇤⇤⇤ 0, 68⇤⇤⇤
Control 0, 44⇤⇤⇤ 0, 42⇤⇤⇤ 0, 52⇤⇤⇤ 0, 47⇤⇤⇤ 0, 43⇤⇤⇤ 0, 47⇤⇤⇤
Obedience 0, 62⇤⇤⇤ 0, 61⇤⇤⇤ 0, 68⇤⇤⇤ 0, 49⇤⇤⇤ 0, 50⇤⇤⇤ 0, 49⇤⇤⇤
Respect 0, 53⇤⇤⇤ 0, 36⇤⇤⇤ 0, 52⇤⇤⇤ 0, 48⇤⇤⇤ 0, 24⇤⇤⇤ 0, 48⇤⇤⇤
Note: queen contiguity weighting matrix; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
using 999 permutations and pseudo p-value. Data for ESS in 1999 refers to 2002
I =
P
i
P
j wij(xi   x)(xj   x)
m2
P
i
P
j wij
(2.1)
where wij = 1 if region i is contiguous to region j; x is the average of the target variable, xi and
m2 =
P
i(xi   x)2/n is the second moment. There are several definitions of contiguity3, the most
famous being "queen contiguity" (two regions are considered ’neighbours’ if they share at least one
border or a vertex) or ’rook contiguity’ (only shared borders are considered - see figure 2.2). The
elements of the weighting matrix are usually row standardized, i.e. each element is divided by the
row sum, such that each row of the new standardized matrix sums to one and so a spatially lagged
variable, WX =
Pn
j=1 wijxj , is just the average of the neighbouring units.
Global Moran’s I gives a first measure of the overall degree of linear association between variable
x and the neighbouring values, indicating whether the observed spatial pattern is clustered, dispersed
or random. Positive values of Global Moran’s I indicate positive spatial correlation, or clustering,
while negative values indicate dispersion 4. In a second step, it is possible to compute the Local
Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA), which allow the decomposition of Global Moran’s I at level
of each unit of observations, and consider its graphic counterpart, the so-called Moran’s scatterplot.
3Other types of weighting matrices, including inverse distance and socio-economic weighting matrices, could be
applied. The choice of weighting matrix usually depends on the research question.
4The expected value of Global Moran’s I is  1/(n 1) for zero spatial correlation, where n is the number of spatial
units.
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Local Moran’s I for observation i may be defined as:
Ii =
(xi   x)
m2
X
j
wij(xj   x). (2.2)
Clearly, Local and Global Moran’s I are linked; Anselin (1993) shows that the sum of Local
Moran’s I is proportional to Global Moran’s I; the numerator of (2.1) is the sum of (2.2) across i,
while the denominator is equal to the factor of proportionality  , or
  = m2
X
i
X
j
wij . (2.3)
Moran’s scatterplot cross-plots the values of region i against the values of its neighbors. Based
on position, four classes are available: in the 1st quadrant (North-East) are located regions with
high values of X surrounded by neighbors with high values of X (High-high or HH quadrant); in
the 2nd quadrant (North-West) are located regions with low levels of X surrounded by neighbors
with high values of X (Low-High or LH quadrant); in the 3rd quadrant (South-West) are positioned
regions with low levels of X surrounded by neighbors with similarly low levels of X (Low-Low or
LL quadrant); finally, in the 4th quadrant (South-East) are found regions with high values of X
surrounded by neighbors with low values of X (High-Low or HL quadrant). Under positive spatial
association, the mass of points will be concentrated on the 1st and 3rd quadrants (HH and LL) and,
under standardization, the slope of the linear interpolation of the points on a Moran’s scatterplot
is the Global Moran’s I (see figure 2.3).
Cluster analysis
If positive, Local Moran’s I indicates a region surrounded by neighbours with similar high or low val-
ues, thus the existence of a cluster while a negative value indicates a region surrounded by dissimilar
neighbouring features, an outlier. There is a formal test, based on the null H0 of Complete Spatial
Randomness (CSR), for the existence of spatial clusters; indeed, we can compute the standardized
value of Local Moran’s I, the so-called “z-score”, zi, or
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Figure 2.2: Examples of spatial contiguity
Source: Grubesic (2008)
Figure 2.3: An example of Moran Scatterplot
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Figure 2.4: Example of cluster map
zi =
Ii   E(Ii)p
V (Ii)
(2.4)
and the corresponding p-value for H0; a positive z-score suggests we have more similarities
between our features/regions (i.e. all positive or negative values) than we would expect in a spatial
random allocation; on the opposite, a negative z-score identifies a situation with dissimilar regions,
i.e. we are in the presence of an outlier. If we reject the null, we can state that we are in presence of
some underlying spatial process at work. A cluster map using Local Moran’s I (see an example in
figure 2.4) can be constructed by selecting only values which are statistically significant at 5 percent.
Classification is based according to the sign of Local Moran’s I and with respect to the mean. If Ii is
positive and values of X for both region i and neighbours are above mean value, they all belong to a
cluster “High-High” (HH). On the opposite, if region i and its neighbours have values that are below
the mean, they belong to a “Low-Low” (LL) cluster. If the value of Ii is negative while the values
of X are above (below) the mean while its neighbours are below (above) the mean, they belong to
a cluster “High-Low” (“Low-High”).
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Review of spatial regression models
Introducing space in our standard regression framework points out to a misspecification problem.
Indeed, let’s consider a simple cross-sectional model where space is missing:
Y =  X + u (2.5)
where   is a K + 1 vector. If, for any reason, the error term is correlated with any covariate,
the estimates are biased. In the case of spatially correlated data (such as housing prices, depending
on the values of the neighbours), we are likely facing endogeneity without a proper data generating
process (DGP). Thanks to the seminal works by Cliﬀ and Ord (1973, 1981) (thus the name "Cliﬀ-
Ord models") but also Paelinck and Klassen (1979) or Anselin (1988), spatial econometrics allows
analysis of spatially correlated data. We can consider a model, with a spatial lag in our dependent
variable, Wy, where Wy =
Pn
j=1 wijyj which captures the eﬀect of agglomeration and spatial
spillovers, also known as spatial autoregressive model or SAR:
y = ↵+X  +  Wy + u. (2.6)
Clearly, we cannot estimate equation 2.6 with OLS as our dependent variable is now correlated
with the error term, u. In another setting we could have spatial autocorrelation in the error term,
as in the Spatial error model or SEM:
8><>:y = X  + uu = ⇢Wu+ ⌫ (2.7)
In this case, standard estimation methods provide consistent, albeit ineﬃcient, estimates, thus
the need to use spatial econometric tools to increase precision. Finally, we could consider models
where there is spatial correlation both in the dependent variable and in the error term (Spatial
autoregressive model with a spatial autoregressive disturbance - SARAR - eq. 2.8) or in the dependent
and independent variables (Spatial Durbin model - see eq. 2.9)
8><>:y =  Wy +X  + uu = ⇢Wu+ ⌫ (2.8)
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y = ↵+X  +  W1y +  W2X + u (2.9)
It follows that the appropriate model depends on the research question and theory.
2.2.4 Exploratory Space-Time Data Analysis (ESTDA)
Exploratory space data analysis techniques give a static representation of the degree of spatial
association of our variables of interest. However, important questions arise with respect to the
spatial dynamics of social capital and the probability of spatial change. For example, consider just
one facet of social capital, generalized trust. It will be of interest monitoring how regions change
their trusting attitudes in relation to the trusting attitudes of neighbours, controlling for country
fixed eﬀects. This is the essence of an Exploratory Space Time Data Analysis (ESTDA). Following
Rey et al. (2011), the LISA for location i at time t is:
Li,t =
zi,t
P
j wi,jzj,tP
i z
2
i,t
(2.10)
where zi,t is the value of our target variable at location i at time t, expressed in terms of
deviations from the mean. The approach can be best understood by looking at, for example the
trusting attitude of regions and their neighbours in successive Moran scatterplots, i.e. the transitions
of points between the four quadrants (High-High, High-Low, Low-High, Low-Low), as represented
in figure 2.5. Changes in the neighbours’ level of trust with no changes in own values, will be
reflected by vertical shifts (red lines in figure 2.5) from the 2nd to the 3rd quadrants or from the
1st to the 4th (and viceversa). Changes in regional values of trust with no changes in neighbouring
regions’ values will be reflected in horizontal shifts (blue lines), from 2nd to the 1st quadrant or
from the 4th to the 3rd (and viceversa). Instead, changes in both region i and its neighbours, will
be associated with movements along the diagonals (green lines). These transitions can be associated
to a matrix of Markovian probabilities,Pn, where the ijth entry, p(n)ij , is the probability that the
Markov chain starting in state i will be in state j after n steps. Each element of the matrix will give
the probability of a movement type associated with the possible transitions between quadrants of
the Moran’s scatterplot. Values on the main diagonal of this matrix will indicate the probability of
no spatial change. Oﬀ-diagonal values will reflect the probability of regional spatial change. These
movements can be used to classify regions whether they are improving or worsening compared
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to their neighbours. The ESTDA analysis can be extended to consider spatial markov transition
probabilities conditional on neighbours belonging to diﬀerent quartiles of the distribution of social
capital in order to make a sounded comparison.
Fazio and Lavecchia (2013) employ ESTDA techniques using the European social survey (ESS).
They compute the unconditional (with respect to national boundaries or waves) LISA transition
probabilities using the first four waves of the ESS (the 5th wave was not yet available), using a
spatial markov approach, conditional on the distribution of the trusting attitudes. The authors
are aware of the trade-oﬀ between short time span (8 years, in the context of a very persistent
phenomenon such as social capital) and statistical significance at regional level (ESS is the only
survey which ensures, to some degree, data quality at sub national level), and choose to focus
on statistical inference. Later on, they also apply country and wave fixed eﬀects (separately and
together) as controls, by taking the residuals5 of regressions of regional trust on wave and country
dummies, as follows:
xit = ↵0 + ↵i + ↵t t + "it,
where t = 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008,  t and ↵i are the fixed eﬀects, and "it is white noise. In
order to better capture the spatial dynamics of trust, they consider 4 waves of the ESS at NUTS 2
level. Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of losing two countries (Luxembourg and Italy), which
did not participate at the 3rd and 4th wave of the ESS, reducing the number of regions to 161 (from
182). Table 2.3 presents the LISA transition probabilities together with the ergodic probabilities.
The latter refer to the steady state probability for a regular transition matrix and indicate the likely
probability whenever the process has reached an equilibrium. They also give an indication about
how likely a transition is in the long run. The analysis is replicated for the data without controls and
after controlling for wave fixed eﬀects and wave and country fixed eﬀects together. This allows to
gauge the role of country eﬀects beyond that of wave eﬀect. First, looking at the LISA probabilities
without controls, they note the high probabilities on the main diagonal, indicating a high degree
of spatial “stickiness”. In general, there is very little probability of spatial change: regions with
high (low) levels of trust will be close to regions with high (low) levels of trust, consistently with
the positive values of the Global Moran’s I (0.42 in 2002 and 0.65 in 2008). This is also confirmed
5Residuals are rescaled to avoid negative numbers.
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by the higher ergodic probabilities associated to the HH and LL columns. Very small probabilities
are associated with spatial change, i.e. oﬀ-diagonal elements of the matrix. Results are largely
similar controlling for wave eﬀects as probabilities on the main diagonal are always larger than
probabilities oﬀ-diagonal. There is also a moderate increase in the probabilities associated with
the main diagonal of a Moran scatterplot, i.e. staying in HH or LL, and a moderate decrease in
the probabilities associated with the secondary diagonal, i.e. staying in LH or HL, indicating that
these regions are now more likely to be in transition. With respect to the substantial increase in
oﬀ-diagonal probabilities, it seems that starting from a position such as LH, a region is more likely
to stay in LH or, alternatively, equally likely to become a high trusting region (move to HH) or see
a decline in the neighbours’ trust (move to LL). If a region is in HL, it faces similar probabilities
of staying in HL, of becoming less trusting (LL) or seeing neighbours become more trusting (HH).
In all cases, controlling for wave eﬀects, oﬀ-diagonal probabilities are always smaller than the long
run steady-state, as indicated by the ergodic probabilities. Interestingly, controlling for both wave
and country eﬀects seems to dramatically reduce probabilities on the main diagonal, increasing
the probability of spatial change (the oﬀ-diagonal elements). In some instances, these probabilities
are larger than the ergodic steady-state probabilities. This result implies that controlling for the
eﬀects of national borders, the possibility of spatial change substantially increases. In other words,
national borders (and the forces they synthesize, such as formal and informal institutions) seem to
apply some degree of resistance to regional spatial change. Removing these reduces the probability
of staying in the same cluster. However, this eﬀect is at work not only on HH clusters, but also on
LL clusters. They conclude that while the first can be considered a positive eﬀect of national borders
(as regions endowed with higher trusting attitudes will likely keep these levels), the second clearly
is not. From a European integration perspective, national borders (proxy of formal and informal
national institutions) seem to prevent the spreading of similar values and beliefs, and trust in this
example.
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Figure 2.5: Interpretation of spatial transitions
Table 2.3: LISA transition probabilities
No Controls Wave Controls Country and Wave Controls
HH LH LL HL HH LH LL HL HH LH LL HL
HH 0.75 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.85 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.47 0.16 0.15 0.21
LH 0.17 0.67 0.16 0 0.23 0.50 0.25 0.02 0.26 0.38 0.29 0.07
LL 0.02 0.10 0.75 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.80 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.48 0.15
HL 0.13 0 0.17 0.70 0.30 0.06 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.08 0.30 0.30
ss 0.27 0.17 0.32 0.24 0.45 0.10 0.36 0.09 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.18
Analysis on 4 waves of the European Social Survey (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008)
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2.3 Principal component analysis
As stated at the beginning of the chapter, principal component analysis (PCA), a technique to
reduce multidimensionality of a dataset to just few variables, seems to be appropriate in the context
of social capital. Indeed, a multidimensional approach sounds the most reasonable way to solve
the vagueness of definitions plaguing social capital. As pointed out by the European Commission
(Annoni and Dikjstra, 2013):
"among multivariate methods, PCA is particularly suitable for statistically summarizing
data in a parsimonious way. It is in fact a dimensionality reduction technique which is designed
to capture all relevant information into a small number of transformed dimensions. The useful-
ness of PCA in composite developing is easy to understand: each dimension in a composite is
designed to describe a particular aspect of the latent phenomenon to be measured"
As explained by the reference book of Jolliﬀe (2002), PCA transforms the old dataset into a new
set of variables, uncorrelated, retaining the greatest variation present in the original dataset. It is a
way to dramatically reduce the number of variables involved, easing the interpretation. A technique
firstly employed by Pearson in 1901, the principal components derive from the following constrained
optimization problem regarding the variance of the dataset x times the vector ↵1:
max var[↵
0
1x] = ↵
0
1⌃↵1,
usually (albeit not necessarily) under the constraint ↵
0
1↵1 = 1. Indeed, ↵1 is the eigenvector
associated to the largest eigenvalue of ⌃, the covariance matrix, and ↵1x is the first principal
component. More generally, ↵kx is the k th Principal Component (PC) associated to, respectively,
the k th largest eigenvector and eigenvalue, ↵k and  k. The eigenvector ↵k is also known as loading.
Alternately, the vector of principal components z, can be obtained by z = Ax⇤ where A is a matrix
of eigenvectors of the correlation matrix, instead of covariance matrix, and x⇤, some standardized
variables. There are several advantages related to the use of the correlation rather than covariance
matrix, such as that principal components based on covariance matrices are sensible to the units
of measure of each element of x. Jolliﬀe (2002) makes the following example: let’s consider two
variables, x1 and x2, the first measuring the length of something, the second measuring the weight.
When x1 is measured in centimetres, the correlation matrix is ⌃1 while if measured in millimetres
(thus just multiplying by 10), the correlation matrix is ⌃2 or
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Figure 2.6: Example of biplot
⌃1=
80 44
⌃2=
8000 44
44 80 44 8000
A small diﬀerence leading to very distinct outcomes: indeed the first principal component using
⌃1 is 0.707x1 +0.707x2 (i.e. both variables have equal weight) while using ⌃2 is 0.998x1 +0.055x2,
i.e. the first variable drives almost entirely the first principal component! Also, the variance ex-
plained increases: the first principal component accounts for 77.5 percent of the variance, but 99.3
in the second case. In the end, Jolliﬀe (2002) recommends not to use covariance matrix unless the
variables share all the same units of measure and have similar variances (otherwise one will domi-
nate). The main drawback of using the correlation matrix is related to the statistical inference and
the interpretation of the results; indeed, the obtained coeﬃcients refer to the standardized variables
and thus they have to be divided by the standard deviation of the corresponding variable in order to
interpret PCs in terms of original variable (keeping in mind that they are not the PC of the original
dataset). It should be noted that the sign of any PC is completely arbitrary and that regarding the
use of discrete/dichotomous variables, Jolliﬀe (2002) remarks that apart from inferential purposes,
there is no particular requirement. A graphical interpretation is given by biplots that simultaneously
plot the relative positions of the p variables and the n observations involved in two dimensions (the
first and second PC - see figure 2.6). An important issue is related to the choice of the “correct”
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Figure 2.7: Example of screeplot
number of PCs. There is no silver bullet, but three rules of thumb:
1. retrieve only up to the m   th PC whose eigenvalue is greater than 1 (Kaiser, 1960) - this
works only with the correlation matrix;
2. given this, achieve the greatest explained variance;
3. the analysis of the so-called “scree” plot, i.e. a graph of the eigenvalues (which are automatically
ordered by size) vs. the corresponding PC, retaining only those components above the point
of inflection (Cattell, 1966) (see figure 2.7 for an example).
In the end, PCA is a very useful data reduction technique but requires caution in its use.
2.4 Wrap up of the chapter
Section 2.1 reviews three categories of available empirical measures: survey data, experiments and
outcome based measures. Surveys attempt to measure directly those values (such as tolerance,
respect for others, autonomy) and beliefs (such as trustworthiness or fairness) usually associated
to communities with high level of social capital. Several international surveys are available, such
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as the World Value Survey, the European Value study or Eurobarometer, just to mention some,
ensuring harmonized estimates of values and beliefs across countries. There are concerns about the
reliability of answers due to issues of social desirability (i.e. the desire to please the interviewer),
cognitive dissonance or lack of mutually exclusive answers (which could distort the answers) but
standardized questions and several research on this topic have reduced the concern about their
use. Alternatively, one could resort to experiments, whose main advantage derives from imposing
a well-defined frame, easing interpretations and reducing measurement errors and bias, creating
situations which are incentive-compatible. The main problem with this approach is the lack of
external validity as samples are generally made of graduate students. Eventually, the most used
approach is based on indirect estimation, by observing the eﬀects of social capital, the so called
"outcome based measures". Advantages are the availability of longer time series (e.g. voter turnout),
comparability across country and statistical representativeness at sub national level. Unfortunately,
they are also serious issues of endogeneity and/or measurement errors.
Eventually, there is a role for space regarding social capital, as we argue in section 2.2.1, being
reminiscent of the first law of geography: "everything is related to everything else, but near things are
more related than distant things"(Tobler, 1970). Indeed, to the extent that the formation of cultural
traits will depend on human interactions, the strength of these ties will depend on transaction costs,
which are typically increasing with distance. As a consequence, since social relations are spatially
sticky, so are norms and values. Space has several dimension which should be considered; indeed the
relationship between space and social capital can occur in an horizontal continuous space marked
by distance, an horizontal discontinuous space marked by borders and a hierarchical space with
discontinuities due to multiple levels of markets and governance. Space has long being ignored by
economists because of its diﬃcult mathematical tractability. However, after 30 years of research,
there are now techniques able to identify and overcome the specific issues of spatial data, such as
the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP), or statistical inference at sub national level, which
are exposed in section 2.2.2. A discussion on spatial statistics and econometrics has been presented
(section 2.2.3), with details on statistics of global and local spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I),
weighting matrices, definition of contiguity and spatial clusters. Then, in order to study space
and time dynamics jointly, Exploratory space-time data analysis (ESTDA) techniques have been
exposed in section 2.2.4, with an applied exercise for 161 european regions; indeed, after computing
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the probability of staying in the same spatial cluster, there is evidence that national borders (proxy
of formal and informal institutions) aﬀect the way values and beliefs (specifically, generalized trust)
are spread across space.
Finally, in section 2.3, a description of the Principal component analysis, a technique to achieve
data reduction, is reported, in order to face the issues of multidimensionality of social capital.
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Chapter 3
A new measure of social capital
To the extent social capital is a multidimensional concept, has suggested by theory, and ignored
by most of the empirical literature, there is the need to encapsulate all the available pieces of
information into synthetic indicators1. Starting from nine measures presented in chapter 3, new
syntethic measures of social capital are presented in section 3.1, aiming at testing the diﬀerence
between a structural and cognitive component of social capital. An analysis on the presence of
clusters of similar values in Europe is the object of section 3.2·
3.1 A multidimensional approach to measure civic capital
3.1.1 Data description
We select nine variables at regional level, typically used in empirical studies on social capital, across
Europe. Five of these can be referred to the so-called "structural component” of civic capital (Righi
and Scalise, 2013) and include voter turnout at parliamentary elections (Putnam, 1993; Nannicini
et al., 2010), relational intensity, and “media use” as of Newspapers,Radio and TV (Putnam, 1993;
de Dominicis et al., 2013). The remaining variables refer to the so called “cognitive component”
1This chapter has been drafted as the result of the paper "Social capital across european regions" joint with Giorgio
Fazio under the auspices of the project "Social capital, institutions and behaviours" sponsored by Banca d’Italia. We
would like to thank Paolo Sestito, Guido de Blasio and Guglielmo Barone for their precious comments. sponsored
by Banca d’Italia between 2012 and 2013.
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of civic capital and consider the perception of norms, values and beliefs. Here, in line with the
literature on civic capital, we consider variables that should capture the attitude of individuals
towards the community, such as the perception of one’s control over life, the importance of respect
for the others as a value to teach your children, the extent of generalized trust and autonomy
(see table 3.1 for a taxonomy). Details about the construction of the dataset are provided in
section 3.3. Our data sources include: two issues of the Eurobarometer (European Commission,
2004a,b), a survey implemented since 1973 by the European Commission to monitor public opinion
in the Member States; its Swiss counterpart, MOSAiCH ("Measures and Sociological Observation
of Attitudes" in Switzerland - Mosaich, 2005, 2009), which mimics some part of the Eurobarometer;
the European Election Database (EED) of the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) for
the Parliamentary voter turnouts around 2008 (NSD-EED, 2013); finally, the 4th wave (2008) of the
European Value Study (EVS) for the variables referring to norms, values and beliefs (EVS, 2011). 2
In terms of the territorial units involved, we refer to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units
for Statistics (NUTS) of Eurostat, and mostly consider NUTS 2 regions, corresponding to Italian
regioni, french departments or Spanish Comunidades y ciudades autonomas, which is also the level
typically considered by EU cohesion policies, with the notable exception of Germany, where data
refer to the NUTS 1 level, corresponding to the German lander. Eventually, our dataset includes a
total of 16 countries and 156 regions at the NUTS 2 level (NUTS 1 for Germany - see table 3.13). 3
3.1.2 Structural vs cognitive measures of civic capital
As discussed above, civic capital should be considered in its multidimensional nature. Here, to
capture such “multidimensionality”, we exploit the information embedded in the nine variables de-
scribed above. As a first step, table 3.2 presents the matrix of correlations between these variables
(for descriptive statistics see table 3.14). Some interesting information already emerge from this
table. First of all, since these variables are typically associated to social capital, we would expect
2The European Value Study (EVS) is a large-scale, cross-national longitudinal research program on basic human
values running every 9 years with focus on European countries. The study covered ten countries in its first wave in
1981 and 26 nations in its fourth wave in 2008.
3Following the Eurobarometer, we merged 6 Italian regions into 3 new regions: Piemonte and Valle d’Aosta,
Abruzzo and Molise, Puglia and Basilicata.
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Table 3.1: Taxonomy of social capital measures
Structural component Cognitive component
Media Use: Newspapers Respect for others
Media Use: TV Control of your life
Media Use: Radio Autonomy
Relational intensity Generalized Trust
Voter turnout
them to be to a large extent collinear. However, while there is some correlation structure in the
data, not all variables are positively or significantly correlated. This seems to be the case even if
the variables related to the structural and cognitive components of social capital are considered sep-
arately. For example, with respect to the former, relational intensity is correlated with only two of
the four measures of the structural component and with three measures of the cognitive component
(control of your life, generalized trust and autonomy). Voter turnout, another common measure
of the structural component, is correlated with the use of newspapers and TV, but also with two
measures of values and beliefs (respect and generalized trust). Reading newspapers and listening to
the radio are positively and significantly correlated among each other, but are also linked with three
cognitive measures: control, generalized trust and autonomy. As mentioned above, TV use is not
generally correlated with any other variable but control of your life (albeit statistical significance
is low). As for the cognitive measures, they appear moderately correlated. Respect, for example,
is correlated with generalized trust, but not with the sense of control of your life or autonomy.
Control, instead, is associated with generalized trust and autonomy. Interestingly, generalized trust
is correlated with all the others cognitive measures, and all but one, structural measures (TV Use).
Greater autonomy is associated with three structural measures (relational intensity, newspaper and
radio use) and two cognitive measures (control and generalized trust).
The correlation analysis seems to suggest that the representation of civic capital may be more
complex than typically postulated and corroborates the need for a multidimensional approach.
Next, we try to encapsulate the information from the above variables into synthetic indicators,
which should capture the many dimensions of civic capital. Obviously, the process of condensing
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complex phenomena into single indicators presents both positive and negative aspects. On one
side, it provides easy to understand summary information, thus allowing ease of interpretation.
On the other, it may oversimplify the complexity of the problem under scrutiny and the obtained
synthesis may be sensible to the procedure of data aggregation. One popular way to achieve variables
reduction is to employ Principal component analysis (see section 2.3). The PCA identifies common
patterns by drawing orthogonal vectors across the data, known as “principal components” (PCs).
These are constructed as optimally weighted linear combinations, after assigning each observation
a “score” and each variable a loading factor. Once the first component is identified, the following
step is to maximize the residual variation,iterating the process, keeping all components orthogonal
to each other. The number of components should be selected to maximize the explained variance
of the data. A logical first step in our analysis is to refer to the taxonomy of table 3.1 and perform
separate PCAs over the two sets of structural and cognitive measures of civic capital. The PCA over
the structural component variables in table 3.3 suggests that the first two principal components are
suﬃcient to explain most of the variation in the data. The loading coeﬃcients seem to highlight a
precise structure where a subset of three variables (relational intensity, newspaper and radio use)
dominates the first principal component and another subset (voter turnout and TV use) dominates
the second. Similarly, for the cognitive component, the PCA results in table 3.4 show that the
first two principal components capture most of the variation in the data. While the first PC is
dominated by the subset of control, generalized trust and autonomy, the second relates mostly to
the importance of respect for others. These results highlight how, even when homogeneous sets of
variables are chosen, the multidimensional nature of civic capital emerges. In order to obtain more
synthetic measures with respect to the two separate components of civic capital, we concentrate on
the first component of each PCA and try to maximize their informational content by repeating the
PCA over restricted sets of variables; precisely, we exclude from the new PCA those variables linked
to the second component. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report on this analysis and show how the refined first
components alone now account for almost 60 percent of total variance and the associated eigenvalues
are well above one. The loadings seem to suggest that none of the selected variables prevails on the
others. This is also more clearly explained by the biplots in figure 3.1.
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Table 3.4: PCA cognitive component of civic capital
Components Loadings
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4 Variable Comp.1 Comp.2
Respect 0.23 0.92
Eigenvalues 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 Control 0.53 -0.07
Prop. of variance 0.43 0.25 0.18 0.14 G.trust 0.61 0.07
Cumulative prop. 0.43 0.68 0.86 1.00 Autonomy 0.54 -0.39
Table 3.5: PCA of the refined structural component of civic capital
Components Loadings
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Variable Comp.1
Eigenvalues 1.7 0.8 0.4 Relational intensity -0.49
Prop. of variance 0.59 0.27 0.14 Newspapers Use -0.65
Cumulative prop. 0.59 0.86 1.00 Radio Use -0.57
Table 3.6: PCA of the refined cognitive component of civic capital
Components Loadings
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Variable Comp.1
Eigenvalues 1.7 0.7 0.6 Control -0.54
Prop. of variance 0.55 0.25 0.20 G.trust -0.61
Cumulative prop. 0.55 0.80 1.00 Autonomy -0.57
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Figure 3.1: Biplots for the refined structural and cognitive components
Refined structural component Refined cognitive component
3.1.3 Full set of variables
We now consider the full set of variables, looking for a synthetic indicator for the whole dataset.
Results in table 3.7 show how the first component for the whole dataset accounts for almost one
third of the total variation in the data, with the associated eigenvalue equal to 2.7, and the second
component accounts for an extra 16 percent, with eigenvalue equal to 1.4. This is not surprising
as, consistently with what previously observed in tables 3.3 and 3.4, voter turnout, TV use and
respect for others (highlighted in bold in table 3.8) appear to behave diﬀerently from the other
measures (either structural or cognitive) of civic capital. Indeed, they have smaller loadings in the
first principal component, while they largely drive the second component. The third component has
an eigenvalue of just one and would increase the explained variation by a mere 11 percent, therefore
we focus only on the first two.
Inspection of the biplots in panel a) of figure 3.2 confirms this analysis and allows the visualization
of the multidimensional nature of civic capital across European regions. The PCA for the full set
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of variables shows how the first PC is dominated by control, autonomy, generalized trust, relational
intensity and use of newspapers and radio. TV use, voter turnout and respect have little relation
with the first component, but dominate the second principal component of the data. To get a more
precise measure of the first principal component, as before we exclude the set of variables linked to the
second principal component and repeat the PCA over the six remaining variables (refined dataset).
Results in table 3.9 show how the first principal component now explains on its own 45 percent of
the total variance, with an eigenvalue of 2.7. The second component adds an extra 15 percent to the
explained variance, but has an eigenvalue of just 0.9. Overall, the contribution of the six variables to
the significant first principal component is balanced, with newspapers use and generalized trust being
the most relevant. The biplot in panel b) of figure 3.2 allows a visual inspection of the evidence in
table 3.9 and further allows observing how a couple of variables, specifically radio use and relational
intensity, may have a “complex” structure, with large, albeit with diﬀerent signs, loadings also on
the second component. Recall, however, that the latter explains too little data variation and it is
not going to be considered in subsequent analysis.
Given that the subset of structural and cognitive measures do not necessarily uniquely represent
civic capital (as our previous results seem to suggest), in the rest of the analysis we focus on the
full set of variables. Specifically, we consider the first and second components identified by the PCA
over the full set of nine variables and, for robustness, also the more precise first principal component
obtained by running the PCA over the refined set of six variables, exploring the spatial distribution
of civic capital across European regions.
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Table 3.8: Loadings of the first and second principal components of the full set of variables
Comp.1 Comp.2
Relational intensity -0.38 0.09
Voter Turnout -0.14 -0.62
Newspapers Use -0.48 -0.07
TV Use 0.00 -0.52
Radio Use -0.36 0.13
Respect -0.12 -0.45
Control -0.36 0.29
G. Trust -0.46 -0.11
Autonomy -0.35 0.11
Figure 3.2: Biplots for the full and refined set of variables
Panel a) Full set of variables Panel b) Refined set of variables
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3.2 The spatial dimension of civic capital in Europe
3.2.1 Maps of civic capital
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the quartile distribution of our measures of civic capital. Figure 3.3
reports the first and second principal components of the PCA over the full set of variables. Some
interesting evidence is worth mentioning. First, from panel a) a clear heterogeneity seems to emerge
across European regions in terms of the endowment of social capital. While regions in Denmark,
Belgium and Austria seem to be the most endowed of social capital, the South of Italy and parts
of Portugal,France, Spain and Poland seem to be the least endowed. Similar evidence of spatial
heterogeneity emerges looking at the second component in panel b) even if with a diﬀerent pattern
identified with respect to the first component. Figure 3.4 reports on the first principal component
obtained from a PCA over the six variables (the so called refined dataset - see table 3.9). This figure
now sharpens the evidence obtained in panel a) of the previous figure, identifying even more clearly
the geographical patterns of high or low levels of our civic capital measure. Overall, the geographic
heterogeneity of social capital seems to be more complex than the usually hypothesized North-South
dichotomy. Rather, the distribution of social capital seems to vary a lot within each country and
in some cases similar values are shared by regions at the border of diﬀerent countries. The next
subsection further explores the spatial distribution of social capital using Exploratory Spatial Data
Analysis methods.
3.2.2 Spatial autocorrelation and Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA)
Next, we perform an exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) that allows detecting patterns of
data similarity related to proximity. While there could be alternative definitions of proximity (e.g.
geographic, economic, institutional socio-economic and so on), here we keep things as simple as
possible and we choose simple geographical proximity (see section 2.2); indeed, we define two regions
as neighbours if they share either a border or a vertex (also known as “first order queen contiguity”).
We can define a weighting matrix, W , such that:
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Figure 3.3: Quartile distributions of the full set of variables
(a) First principal component . (b) Second principal component .
Notes: Darker colours denote higher quartiles
W =
8><>:1 if i and j are neighbours0 otherwise (3.1)
i.e. a n ⇥ n matrix whose ij-th element is equal to 1 if and only if the two regions are contiguous.
Following common practice, we consider the row standardized version of the matrix (i.e. whereP
i wij = 1, or each element of row i is divided by the sum of the row). Our sample consists of
156 regions (see table 3.13) and includes two islands (Sicily and Sardinia), which according to our
contiguity definition, are clearly neighborless (see table 3.15 in section 3.3 for the distribution of
connections). 4
In order to provide an overall measure of spatial correlation in the data we calculate the Global
Moran’s I, or I (see Anselin, 1993):
I =
P
i
P
j wij(xi   x)(xj   x)
m2
P
i
P
j wij
where x and m2 =
P
i(xi x)2/n are, respectively, the mean and variance of the target variable,
xi. I gives a first indication of the degree of linear association between the values of x for region i and
its neighbours. Table 3.10 reports evidence of positive spatial autocorrelation for all the principal
components extracted in the previous section. The first and second principal components extracted
4Eurobarometer does not include any information about Corsica, while we dropped the Spanish isles (Balears and
Canarias).
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Figure 3.4: Quartile distributions of of the refined set of variables)
First principal component
Notes: Darker colours denote higher quartiles
from the full set of variables exhibit a strong degree of spatial autocorrelation with Moran’s I of
respectively 0.69 and 0.58. A similar degree of spatial correlation emerges if the first principal
component of the two subsets of variables are considered, with the structural component displaying
a slightly larger degree of correlation, and for the first PC of the refined set. Running a simulation
with 1000 repetitions suggests that result are robust. The degree of spatial autocorrelation can also
be observed looking at the “Moran’s scatterplots” (see Anselin, 1993 and section 2.2 ) of the values
of variable X of a region against the values of its neighbours, WX. Panel a), b) and c) of figure 3.5
all indicate a strong degree of regional spatial association in the identified measures of civic capital.
Next, we calculate the Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA), which allow the decompo-
sition of Global Moran’s I at the regional level, and a cluster map. The LISA analysis is performed
over the principal components of the full set of variables and the refined set of variables. Figure 3.6
reports on the analysis for the first and second principal components of the full dataset (see table
3.8). Regions coloured in black belong to HH clusters (i.e. regions with high values surrounded
by similarly high values), while grid pattern regions belong to LL clusters (i.e. regions with low
values surrounded by neighbours with low values). Clearly, the two components identify diﬀerent
dimensions of civic capital and also diﬀerent clusters. Panel a) of the figure 3.6 shows how HH
clusters for the first component typically are located in Switzerland and part of Austria and in the
northern European belt identified by Denmark, the northern regions of Germany, the Netherlands
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Table 3.10: Global spatial autocorrelation of the proposed measures of social capital
First PC Second PC
Full set of variables dataset 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤⇤
Refined set of variables 0.68⇤⇤⇤ -
Structural component 0.66⇤⇤⇤ -
Cognitive component 0.51⇤⇤⇤ -
Global Moran’s I
Pseudo p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: First order, row standardized, queen contiguity weighting matrix
and Belgium. LL clusters are (from left to right) in Portugal and Spain, some French regions and
the south of Italy. The LISA of panel b), pertaining to the second principal component, shows a very
diﬀerent picture, with HH clusters in part of Switzerland, Poland and Slovenia. Recall, however,
than the second components represents a much smaller proportion of the total variance of the data.
For robustness, we have perform the PCA over the refined set of variables entering just the first
principal component of the full set of variables. Evidence in figure 3.7 shows that removing the
variables tied to the second component, just confirms the pattern emerging from panel a) of figure
3.6.
The LISA analysis seems to confirm what was already hinted by figures 3.3 and 3.4. There
seems to be a tendency for regions with higher or lower levels of civic capital to cluster together.
Interestingly, these clusters do not necessarily coincide with national borders. In some cases, they
identify part of a country, but often they are located across national borders. This evidence seems to
suggest that patters of similar values may not entirely depend on national borders. Also, it suggests
that breaking vicious circles of low social capital may more diﬃcult when regions are located in a
low social capital trap.
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(a) Panel a) - First pc of the full
dataset.
(b) Panel b) - Second pc of the full
dataset.
(c) Panel c) - First pc of the restricted
dataset.
Figure 3.5: Moran Scatterplots
Figure 3.6: Cluster maps of the full set of variables
a) First principal component b) Second principal component
Dark regions: HH clusters; grid pattern: LL clusters
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Figure 3.7: Cluster map of the refined set of variables
First principal component
Dark regions: HH clusters; grid pattern: LL clusters
3.3 Wrap up of the chapter
Social capital is of critical importance for economic development. However, its quantitative as-
sessment often depends on the specific definition adopted and empirical studies often explore only
part of the complexity embedded in the concept of social capital. The objective of this chapter
has been to empirically investigate the distribution of social capital across European regions. In
order to perform this investigation, capturing the multiple dimensions of social capital, Principal
component analysis has been used (see section 3.1); nine indicators typically used as proxies of social
capital, particularly in its declination in terms of civicness, have been condensed in less variables.
The selected variables can be broadly divided into a subset capturing the structural component of
social capital in a community, based on the degree of actual engagement of people with society, and
a subset capturing its cognitive component, based on the individual attitude in terms of norms,
values and believes that should help overcome the free riding problems of society. The PCA allows
us to “condense” the information of these variables into synthetic indicators, which are then used
to look at the spatial distribution of social capital across European regions (section 3.2). More
specifically, the extent of spatial association of social capital across regions is considered using ex-
ploratory spatial data analysis tools. Even though the theory would suggest that all our variables
are associated with social capital, our empirical analysis confirms that these variables may capture
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diﬀerent aspects of the same phenomenon. Also, the traditional distinction between the structural
and the cognitive component seems to be blurred. In order to synthesize these aspects, we consider
the first principal components of the two subsets of variables, the full set of variables and a refined
set as robustness check. These synthetic indicators seem to indicate some degree of heterogeneity
in the distribution of social capital across European regions, especially within larger countries, such
as Italy, France, Poland and Spain, and with higher values usually characterizing smaller countries
(Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands). In some of these cases, similar values seem to display a tendency
to cluster, irrespective of the national border. In order to assess whether these clusters are spatially
significant, we calculate Global and Local Moran’s I statistics which show some degree of spatial
association in the data and highlight the spatial clustering of regions with similar high or low levels
of social capital. This analysis confirms that these clusters are not necessarily “national”, suggesting
that the forces of geography may overcome national borders when it comes to cultural identities.
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Data Appendix
Our dataset includes the following variables:
A) Structural component of civic capital
1) Relational intensity
Data for relational intensity comes from Eurobarometer 62.2 (question QD5, 2004) for all coun-
tries, except Switzerland, where we had to rely on MOSAiCH. The survey asks the following question:
"How often do you meet socially with friends?" We drop "don’t know" - DK answers. As there is
no perfect correspondence between EB and MOSAiCH, we propose a new variable, matching the
available answers as indicated in table 3.11. We are aware of the trade-oﬀ between loosing an en-
tire variable (as without Switzerland we should exclude the whole variable) and some information
(precisely, we reduce the range of possible answers from 6 to 4) and we opt in favour of keeping the
variable. For Denmark and Slovenia we had to merge data up to NUTS 2 level: the territory of
Denmark was divided in 13 counties (“amt”) up to 2006 which where lately refined to five NUTS 2
regions. Also Slovenia underwent a major change, reducing the number of NUTS 2 regions from 12
to only 2 in 2006. All changes were made following the instructions on “History of NUTS” available
on the Eurostat website 5.
2) Voter turnout
Data for voter turnout have been collected from the European Election Database of the Nor-
wegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) and refers to parliamentary election between 2002-10.
Precisely, we collect data for the following countries (and years): Austria (2008), Belgium (2007),
Czech Republic (average 2002, 2006, 2010), Denmark (2007), France (2002), Germany (2005), Hun-
gary (average 2006 and 2010), Italy (2008), Luxembourg (2009), the Netherlands (2010), Poland
(2007), Portugal (2009), Slovakia (2010), Slovenia (2008), Spain (2008), Switzerland (2007).
3-5) Media use
Data for “media use” have been collected from Eurobarometer 62.2 (questions QA18_1-3, may
2006) and MOSAiCH 2009 for Switzerland. The core question is “About how often do you... watch
television news programmes/ read the news in daily newspapers / listen to radio news programmes? ”
The range of possible answers is similar in Eurobarometer and MOSAiCH (see table 3.12). We drop
DK and rescale such that value 1 corresponds to the answer “never” and 5 to “Every day”. Then
5http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/history_nuts)
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we take the regional mean (using the available sample weights reported), creating the variables
“newspapers”, “TV” and “radio”. For Denmark and Slovenia we had to merge up to NUTS 2 level6.
B) Cognitive component of social capital
6-9) Norms, values and beliefs
Norms, values and beliefs, measured in the European Value Study (EVS), are widely used in the
literature. Following Tabellini (2010), we select four values: generalized trust, control, respect and
obedience. Generalized trust is measured through the question
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can be too
careful in dealing with people?” There are two possible answers: 1 ‘Most people can be trusted”
or 2 ‘You can’t be too careful”.
The variable "G. trust" is the regional percentage of people who answer that “most people can
be trusted” over the total number of responses. Another value measured is "control" of life:
“Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other
people feel that what they do has no real eﬀect on what happens to them. Please use the scale
to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life
turns out?”
The variable is coded with response from 1 to 10, where 1 means “no control” and 10 “a great
deal”. The variable "control" is built as regional weighted average (times 10). As for "respect" and
"obedience", they both refer to the following question:
Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any,
do you consider to be especially important?”
The possible answers include respect for others and obedience. The variables "respect" and
"obedience" are then the weighted percentage of people who mentioned these values as qualities
that should be taught to children over the total number of respondents. With respect to "obedi-
ence", Tabellini (2010) suggests this is a negative value, as it is the basis of hierarchical societies, a
6Same remarks as for “relational intensity” apply
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Table 3.12: Question on Media use
Media use: “about how often do you watch/read/listen...TV/newspapers/radio?
Eurobarometer (EB) MOSAiCH
Everyday (5) Everyday (5)
Several times a week (4) 3-4 day a week (4)
Once or twice a week (3) 1-2 days a week (3)
Less often (2) Less than 1-2 days a week (2)
Never (1) Never (1)
DK DK
Answer and value in parentheses
coercive cultural environment stifling individuals initiative and cooperation (thus we expect a neg-
ative impact). Thus, taking this into account, we have rescaled the variable so that a higher value
of "obedience" (which is considered as bad) means less people consider "obedience" as something
should be taught, transforming in the new variable "autonomy". Precisely, "autonomy"= 100 - the
percentage of people mentioning "obedience" as something should be taught”.
Islands and merges
Eurobarometer does not include any pieces of information about the french island of Corsica
while we dropped the Spanish islands (Balearic and Canarias). Instead we have data about Sicily
and Sardinia, the greatest Italian islands.
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Table 3.13: Countries and regions involved
Country name Number of regions Type
Austria 9 NUTS 2
Belgium 11 NUTS 2
Czech Republic 8 NUTS 2
Denmark 5 NUTS 2
France 21 NUTS 2
Germany 16 NUTS 1
Hungary 7 NUTS 2
Italy 17 NUTS 2
Luxembourg 1 NUTS 2
Netherlands 12 NUTS 2
Poland 16 NUTS 2
Portugal 5 NUTS 2
Slovak Republic 4 NUTS 2
Slovenia 2 NUTS 2
Switzerland 7 NUTS 2
Total 156 NUTS 1/2
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Table 3.14: Descriptive statistics of the dataset
Min 1st Q Median Mean 3rd Q Max n. obs range
Relational intensity 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.7 156 [1-4]
Voter turnout 45.5 62.6 71.3 70.3 78.7 94.2 156 [0 - 100]
Newspapers use 2.0 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.5 156 [1- 5]
TV use 3.7 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.9 156 [1- 5]
Radio use 1.8 3.2 3.6 3.5 3.9 4.5 156 [1- 5]
Respect 32.0 67.9 77.5 75.5 85.6 100 156 [0 - 100]
Control 44.4 62.0 65.8 65.7 69.2 84.0 156 [0 - 100]
G. trust 0.0 22.2 33.5 36.3 45.8 100 156 [0 - 100]
Autonomy 23.2 64.0 72.5 72.7 81.7 100 156 [0 - 100]
Table 3.15: Distribution of connections in the weighting matrix
n. neighbours 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
n. regions 2 9 7 16 28 41 25 15 8 2 1 1 1
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Chapter 4
Social capital and growth: a within Europe
perspective
As seen before, a wide range of studies emphasizes the role of social capital as driver of economic
development. While many focus on cross-country variations, Tabellini (2010) proposes a within-
country perspective, where historical institutions aﬀect current culture (intended as civic, social and
economic behaviour), instead of contemporary institutions, which in turn aﬀect economic growth.
However one of the instruments chosen by Tabellini is likely suﬀering from weak correlation with the
(endogenous) measure of social capital. In this chapter, after a general discussion (section 4.1), we
will formally test the strength of the chosen instrumental variables, trying to overcome the problem
with the spatial lag of the existing instruments (section 4.2). Then, as suggested by LeSage and
Fischer (2008) we will move to a spatial regression approach (see section 4.3).
4.1 The role of culture
Following the strain of literature that identifies two channels for social capital formation, namely
parents or direct socialization (i.e. transmission of specific values and beliefs) and socio-economic
environment or indirect socialization, Tabellini (2010) estimates the following equation:
Y = ↵+  C +  Y0 +  X + e (4.1)
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where Y is average per capita GDP over the period 1995-2000, adjusted for purchasing power
and expressed as percentage of the EU-15 average (variable yp9500 in table 4.1); Y0 is past eco-
nomic development (approximated by urbanization rate at 1850, variable urb_180 ) while X are
controls such as the gross enrolment rate in primary and secondary school in 19601 (variable school)
and country dummies (proxy of current political institutions), which should proxy current social
interactions.
As for C, culture, following Banfield (1958), Tabellini (2010) extracts the principal components
(PC) of four variables from two waves of the European Value Study - EVS (1990 and 1999): gener-
alized trust, respect for others, control over life and obedience. In this context, culture is a proxy of
social capital. The first PC is named pc_culture; the PC from the three "positive values" (g. trust,
respect and control) is pc_culture_pos and the first PC regarding values to be taught to children
(respect and obedience), pc_children. To the extent social capital is a multidimensional concept
(see section 1.1.2) and following Solow’s critique we propose two additional measures of social cap-
ital, pc1 and pc1_val which are the results of the analysis reported in chapter 32 and an update of
pc_culture respectively. Overall, the dataset encompasses 8 western European countries (France,
West Germany, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal) and 69 regions.
In table 4.2 we report the results from the OLS estimation, with robust standard errors in square
brackets since the Breusch-Pagan tests reject the null of homoskedasticity for all specifications. In
columns 1 to 3 we have results very similar to those found by Tabellini (2010), even if in our sample
6 regions (out of 69) are dropped3 (the islands - see figure 4.2). All the measures of social capital
are positive and statistically significant at 5 percent and results are also sizable: one standard
deviation in the first measure of social capital (pc_culture) results in an increase of 17.5 points of
per capita GDP (expressed with respect to the EU-15 average), and similarly for pc_culture_pos
1Including a measure of education reduces the risk that social capital might become a proxy of human capital -
see section 1.2.3
2Variable pc1 is the first PC from variables obedience, control, respect and generalized trust of the latest (2008)
wave of the EVS, plus the share of blood donations, people using TV/Radio or newspapers as source of info and
voter turnout around 2008. Variable pc1_val is the first PC for the aforementioned values and beliefs from the latest
(2008) EVS (see Appendix of chapter 3 for further details)
3To the extent we want to use our new measures of social capital, pc1 and pc1_val, as there is no available data
for Madeira, the Azores, Baleares or Canarias isles, we had to drop these observations. Moreover, as we want to
perform a spatial analysis in the following, we drop also Sicily and Sardinia, in order to keep only contiguous regions.
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Table 4.1: Descriptives statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dep. Variable (Y )
yp9500 63 97.33 30.46 50.17 215.33
Covariates (X,Y0)
school 63 73.52 11.55 51.55 95.48
urb_rate1850 63 11.66 13.64 0 57.43
Measures of social capital (C)
pc_culture 63 -1.09 30.12 -56.69 57.22
pc_children 63 -0.49 23.90 -57.62 58.28
pc_culture_pos 63 -2.25 25.00 -49.99 39.47
pc1 63 0 1.54 -3.50 3.35
pc1_val 63 0 1.21 -2.30 4.51
Instrumental variables (Z)
pc_institutions 63 0.06 2.00 -2.09 3.58
literacy 63 55.98 25.52 14.6 96.5
and pc_children. In columns 4 and 5 instead we have the two new measures; in the case of pc1
we have a positive and significant coeﬃcient with an order of magnitude greater than the previous
measures. Using instead the same variables as in pc_culture but from the latest wave of the EVS
(2008), our pc1_val measure, we have a coeﬃcient which is almost twentyfold. Of course, in the
latter cases, the greater magnitude is explained by looking at the descriptives of table 4.1. Indeed,
an increase of one standard deviation of pc1 or pc1_val, results in an increase of almost 15 points
of per capita GDP (again, with respect to the EU-15 average).
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Table 4.2: OLS estimates [with robust s.e.]
VARIABLES yp9500
school 0.54 0.79 0.62 0.32 0.50
(0.53) (0.52) (0.54) (0.58) (0.55)
[0.31]* [0.30]** [0.37]* [0.37] [0.38]
urb_rate1850 0.63 0.70 0.63 0.65 0.51
(0.21)*** (0.21)*** (0.22)*** (0.23)*** (0.23)**
[0.18]*** [0.17]*** [0.17]*** [0.21]*** [0.21]**
pc_culture 0.58
(0.15)***
[0.13]***
pc_culture_pos 0.71
(0.18)***
[0.17]***
pc_children 0.61
(0.18)***
[0.20]***
pc1 9.70
(3.43)***
[3.40]***
pc1_val 11.9
(3.66)***
[3.76]***
Observations 63 63 63 63 63
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.57 0.59
Breusch-Pagan chi2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Jarque-Bera chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Robust] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
Breusch-Pagan tests the null of homoskedasticity. Jarque-Bera tests normality
Country dummies are included.
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4.2 Addressing endogeneity
Results in table 4.2 suggest a significant role for social capital in explaining diﬀerent economic
performances at regional level. However results are likely biased by the endogeneity of culture (see
section 1.2.1). It follows the need to modify the identification strategy, on the grounds that culture
is determined by contemporaneous social interactions and inherited cultural traditions. Tabellini
(2010) postulates the following model for social capital accumulation:
C = a+ dC0 + bY0 + cX + u (4.2)
where C0 is (unobserved) culture of ancestors, while X is a proxy of contemporary interactions.
As C0 cannot be estimated, iterating the argument it is possible to obtain a stochastic process for
current culture:
C =  1 +  2X0 +  3Y0 +  4X + v (4.3)
where X0 is the historical counterpart of X i.e. the literacy rate in 1880 (variable literacy) and
political institutions in the past (pc_institutions4), measured by constraints on the executive in
the countries between 1600-1885. These variables have been chosen by Tabellini as instrumental
variables for C in eq.4.1, under a rather strong exclusion restriction, i.e. that past social interactions,
summarized by X0, do not aﬀect current ones, although this is mildly mitigated by controls for
education and past economic development/urbanization rate.
In addressing the endogeneity problem we should pay attention to the two fundamental require-
ments of instrumental variables techniques:
1. exclusion restrictions hold (i.e. instruments are exogenous);
2. the instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous variable;
As a first step, we substite C with the instruments into eq.4.1, a way to test the exclusion
restriction, the so called reduced form. Indeed, the instruments should aﬀect Y only via the endoge-
nous variable, not directly. This is performed, either in the case of homoskedastic or non-spherical
4The variable is computed by Tabellini as the principal component of five measures of constraints on the executive
at five points in time (1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850), using the POLITY IV database and the work by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2012).
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errors, in the reduced forms (see tables 4.3 and 4.4), at first each by itself (columns 1 and 2), then
together (column 3). Apart from variable school, results are similar to those in Tabellini (2010);
as we can see, each instrumental variable taken alone has explanatory power over the dependent
variable. However, taken together, only literacy remains significant, while pc_institutions is at best
weakly significant (consistently with Tabellini). This evidence from the reduced form rules against
literacy as instrumental variable. Columns 4-8 report the result of the first stage regressions where
it can be observed that both instruments have jointly predictive power with respect to pc_culture
and pc_culture_pos while urb_rate1850 and school are not significant with any proposed measure
of social capital (except pc1 for school). This is good as it sustains the identification strategy (i.e.
culture is explained by specific channels, X0). It should be noted that in the case of pc_children and
pc1_val the instrument literacy is not significant (pc_institutions in the case of pc1 ). In the next
section we will deal with instrumental variable estimation but first, we introduce some theoretical
considerations on weak instruments.
4.2.1 A weak instruments problem?
Let’s consider the following regression equation
Y = X  +   (4.4)
where Y and X are T x 1 vectors of observations of the dependent and independent variables,
  is the coeﬃcient of the regressor and   is a T x 1 vector of i.i.d. errors. If X is an endogenous
regressor, the reduced form equation for X is
X = Z⇧+ V (4.5)
where Z is a T x K2, with K2   1, matrix of the exogenous instrumental variables (IVs), ⇧ is a
K2 x 1 vector of coeﬃcients and V is a T x 1 vector of i.i.d. N(0, v) errors.
If the correlation of the instruments with the endogenous variable is weak, the IV estimator is
biased in the direction of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator and its distribution is non-
normal (Bun and de Haan , 2010). Moreover, as pointed out by John Bound and Baker (1995) in
an experiment with more than 329.000 observations, weak instruments is not just a small-sample
problem. Unfortunately there is still no consensus on a formal test for the strength of the IVs but
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only rules of thumb such as that proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997), i.e. to consider with caution
IVs whose first-stage F statistic is below 10. A promising novelty is represented by Stock and Yogo
(2002) test based on the Cragg and Donald (1993) statistic, gmin, the minimum eigenvalue of matrix
GT defined as
GT = ⌃ˆ
 1/20
V V Y
0PzY 0⌃ˆ
 1/2
V V /K2 (4.6)
with ⌃ˆ 1/2V V =
Y
0
MZY
T K1 K2 , Pz = Z(Z
0Z) 1Z 0andMZ = (I   Pz). GT is the concentration pa-
rameter/matrix, i.e. the matrix analogue of the F-statistic from the first-stage regression of Two
stage least squares (2SLS). To the extent that the approximate bias of IV estimator depends on the
concentration parameter and the number of instruments (Bun and de Haan , 2010), GT can be used
to test the strength of IVs. Originally gmin was designed to test the null of under identification,
which happens when GT is singular. Instead, Stock and Yogo (2002) use it to test whether GT is
non-singular but still suﬃciently small such that IVs are "weak".
In particular, we have weak instruments if at least one of the following is verified:
1. the relative bias of the IV estimator with respect to OLS, exceeds a certain threshold b (usually
10 percent);
2. the actual size of the conventional ↵-level Wald test based on IV statistics exceeds a certain
threshold r (usually 10 percent with a 5 percent power).
The disadvantage of the test based on relative bias is the requirement of at least 3 instruments,
which excludes the application in our case. Stock and Yogo (2002) provide critical values for k-
class estimators such as IV, LIML and Fuller’s modified LIML estimator, under the assumption
of homoskedasticity. Kleibergen and Paap (2006) provide a robust version of the Cragg-Donald,
namely the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic which can be used with the tabulated critical values (under
homoskedasticity) with a considerable degree of caution, as suggested by Drukker et al. (2011). To
the extent that there are no specific values for GMM (either under the two step estimator form -
GMM TSE - or as continuous updating estimator - GMM CUE), following Baum et al. (2007) we
know that:
1. under the null of homoskedasticity, we can use the critical values of IV and LIML, as they can
be considered specific cases of, respectively, GMM-TSE and GMM-CUE;
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Table 4.5: Critical values for weak instruments
Threshold value, r
10% 15% 20% 25%
IV (also GMM-TSE) 19.93 11.59 8.75 7.25
LIML (also GMM-CUE) 8.68 5.33 4.42 3.92
1 endogenous regressors (n) and two instrumental variables (K2)
2. LIML and GMM-CUE are more robust estimators in case of weak instruments (Hahn et al.,
2004).
In the specific case of interest (one endogenous variable and two instruments), the specific critical
values for the IV/GMM-TSE and LIML/GMM-CUE case are available in table 4.5. As we can see,
with a maximum rate of rejection of 10 percent of the Wald test (i.e. the greatest rate of rejection
we want to tolerate) the critical values of the Cragg-Donald statistic ranges between 8.68 (under
LIML/GMM-CUE) and 19.93 (under IV/TSLS/GMM-TSE).
4.2.2 Instrumental variable estimates
Table 4.6 reports the results from 2SLS estimation. As for the exogeneity of the IVs we can notice
that only the last specification (column 5 - variable pc1_val) rejects the null of exogeneity of instru-
ments at the 5 percent level (so called Sargan-Hansen test). As for the strength of the instruments,
the F statistic are all above 10. However, the Cragg-Donald statistic suggests the weakness of all
specifications, with the (feeble) exception of the second (pc_culture_pos), whose coeﬃcient has in-
creased by almost 50 percent with respect to the OLS specification. A Pagan-Hall5 test rejects at the
10 percent the null of homoskedasticity, thus we perform the same analysis using robust standard
errors. Results are available in the same table in square brackets. Similarly, the last specification,
which uses as measure of social capital pc1_val, rejects the null of exogeneity of the instruments
at 5 percent. Again, first stage F statistic is above 10 but, according to the the robust version
5In the case of heteroskedasticity, standard Breusch-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg tests are generally not usable in an
IV setting, thus the Pagan-Hall test.
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of the Cragg-Donald statistic, the Kleibergen-Paap rk, only pc_culture_pos seems to have strong
instruments. As a final remark, in the fourth specification the coeﬃcient of the first-stage F (and
its robust counterpart) is high although both the Cragg-Donald and the Kleibergen-Paap statistics
are not. This remarks the importance of not relying only on first stage F statistic as a way to test
weak instruments. Endogenous variable pc1_val) rejects the null of exogeneity of instruments at
the 5 percent level (so called Sargan-Hansen test). As for the strength of the instruments, the F
statistic are all above the value indicated as rule of thumb (10). However, the Cragg-Donald statis-
tics suggest the weakness of all specifications, with the exception of the second (pc_culture_pos as
proxy of social capital), whose coeﬃcient has increased by almost 50 percent with respect to the
OLS specification. A Pagan-Hall6 test rejects at the 10 percent the null of homoskedasticity, thus we
perform the same analysis using robust standard errors, whose results are available in the same table
in square brackets. Similarly, the last specification, which uses as measure of social capital pc1_val
rejects the null of exogeneity of the instruments at 5 percent. Again, first stage F statistic are above
10 but, according to the the robust version of the Cragg-Donald statistic, the Kleibergen-Paap rk,
only pc_culture_pos seems to have strong instruments. As a final remark, in the fourth specification
the coeﬃcient of the first-stage F is high although both the Cragg-Donald and the Kleibergen-Paap
statistics are not. As previously stated, under homoskedasticity, 2SLS and limited information
maximum likelihood estimation (LIML) estimators are special cases of the Generalized method of
moments (GMM) and, particularly, of GMM-TSE and GMM-CUE, respectively. However, under
heteroskedasticity this no longer holds while Hahn et al. (2004) suggest that LIML and GMM-CUE
perform better than 2SLS or GMM-TSE in presence of weak instruments. In table 4.7 we report
the results from the estimation of GMM-TSE and GMM-CUE under heteroskedasticity. We know
that Hansen J, test for the exogeneity of the instruments, is consistent under heteroskedasticity and
it follows that apart from the 9-th specification (pc1_val under GMM-TSE), all the others do not
reject the null of exogeneity of the instruments at 5 percent. As for the strength of the instruments,
remembering that the critical values for GMM-CUE are diﬀerent (and lower - see table 4.5), results
point to the specification with pc_culture (only GMM-CUE) and pc_culture_pos (both GMM-TSE
and GMM-CUE), with GMM-CUE preferred because of its robustness to weak IV. With respect
to the first OLS specification (see table 4.2) the coeﬃcient of pc_culture is almost twofold while
6In the case of heteroskedasticity, standard Breusch-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg tests are generally not usable in an
IV setting, thus the Pagan-Hall test.
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pc_culture_pos is now 60 percent larger (considering the estimation with GMM-CUE).
4.3 A spatial approach
To the extent social interactions type and strength matter in order to share values, social capital
is clearly related to space, requiring specific estimation procedures. Anselin and Arribas-Bel (2011)
indeed point out that the use of spatial fixed eﬀects could lead to spurious results, while spatial
heterogeneity should be properly treated. LeSage and Fischer (2008), building on previous work by
LeSage and Pace (2008), prove that under two conditions, a linear regression relationship can lead to
a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) or a spatial error model (SEM
- see section 2.2.3). The circumstances that have to be verified are: 1) the existence of an omitted
explanatory variable; 2) spatially correlated OLS residuals. The analysis in the previous section
rules in favour of the first requirement. As for the second, remembering that rejection of the null of
Global Moran’s I suggests the existence of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals (thus the model
is misspecified), additional tests, namely LM Lag and LM Error (and their robust counterparts),
help understanding what type of spatial model should be used. Indeed, once determined spatial
correlation in the residuals, in case of rejection of the null of LM Lag and LM Lag robust, a SAR
model is suggested while in case of rejection of LM Error and LM Error robust, a SEM seems
more appropriate. In table 4.8 we report the results from the five spatial tests on the residuals of
the OLS regressions of table 4.2, assuming a first order queen contiguity weighting matrix, W 7.
Let’s define the spatial lag of variable X as W qX with q = 1, 2, ..n (usually bounded at q = 2),
with WX =
Pn
j=1 wijxj for i 6= j. Imposing row normalization of matrix W , values of WX for a
specific region i represents the average of the neighbouring regions. Results indicate that only the
specification with pc_culture and pc_children reject the null of no spatial autocorrelation of the
residuals and both seems to go in the direction of a SEM model. It follows that both conditions
suggested by LeSage and Pace (2008) hold for these variables, thus, justifying recourse to a spatial
7According to first order queen contiguity criterion, two regions are neighbours if they share either a vertex or a
border. With 63 regions (and no islands) we have 254 links with an average of 4 links per region, a minimum of 1
link and a maximum of 10 links.
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Table 4.6: Two stage least square (2SLS) estimation [with robust s.e.]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES yp9500
school 0.28 0.76 0.30 -0.90 0.14
(0.53) (0.48) (0.59) (0.87) (0.58)
[0.31] [0.27] [0.38]*** [0.66] [0.38]
urb_rate1850 0.52 0.67 0.44 0.40 0.25
(0.21)** (0.20)*** (0.25)* (0.29) (0.27)
[0.19]*** [0.16]*** [0.20]** [0.25] [0.31]
pc_culture 1.02
(0.26)***
[0.27]***
pc_culture_pos 1.04
(0.25)***
[0.30]***
pc_children 1.38
(0.40)***
[0.43]***
pc1 30.6
(9.91)***
[9.34]***
pc1_val 23.5
(7.16)***
[10.7]**
Observations 63 63 63 63 63
Sargan’s stat. p-value 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.25 0.02
Hansen J stat. p-value 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.03
F 17.2 20.1 10.5 15.9 12.3
F [robust s.e.] 25.2 28.4 25.4 35.6 24.0
Cragg-Donald stat. 13.3 19.9 7.24 5.21 8.84
Kleibergen-Paap rk 12.1 22.9 5.48 7.21 8.32
[Robust] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sargan (Hansen J) tests the null of exogeneity. Cragg-Donald (Kleibergen-Paap) tests
the presence of weak iv with critical values by Stock and Yogo (2002)
Country dummies included.
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regression framework. Indeed, attempts to use directly the spatial lags of the proposed instrumental
variables, literacy or pc_institutions, did not produce satisfactory results in terms of strength of the
instruments (see table 4.9), so in the following, considering also the results of the spatial tests and
following LeSage and Fischer (2008), we will estimate a Spatial autoregressive model with spatial
autoregressive disturbances - SARAR), a SEM and a Spatial Durbin Model.
Following Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Postiglione and Piras (2012) a spatial-autoregressive
model with spatial autoregressive disturbances (SARAR), is defined as:
yi =  
nX
j=1
wijyj +
kX
p=1
xip p + ui (4.7)
ui = ⇢
nX
j=1
mijuj + ✏i (4.8)
which could be written in vector form as
y =  Wy +X  + u (4.9)
u = ⇢Mu+ ✏ (4.10)
where y is a n x 1 vector of observation, W and M are n x n spatial weighting matrices, X is
a n x k matrix of k exogenous regressors. Overall, the model has 4 parameters, ✓ =
⇥
 , ⇢, , 2
⇤
and SAR and SEM are just particular cases of SARAR (respectively, when ⇢ = 0 or   = 0).
The innovation term, ✏, is usually assumed to be normally distributed with a general covariance
matrix ⌦, ✏ ⇠ N(0,⌦), which could allow for heteroskedasticity. We assume the simplest case,
homoskedasticity, i.e. ✏ ⇠ N(0, 2), with the same weighting matrix, W , in both eq. 4.7 and 4.8. In
what follows, we will estimate first a SARAR(1,1), then a SEM, using a Generalized Spatial Two
Stage Least Square (GS2SLS)8.
8GS2SLS is a four-steps procedure: in the first step it runs 2SLS to estimate  ˜, where   = [ , 0]0. Then GMM
to estimate ⇢˜. In the third and fourth steps these estimates are reused to obtain eﬃcient estimates. As instruments,
GS2SLS uses the linearly independent columns of (Xf ,WXf ,W 2Xf ) for SARAR, (Xf ,WXf ) for SEM, where Xf
is the matrix of all the excluded exogenous variables. In what follows we will call these linearly independent columns
the "standard instruments" of any GS2SLS regression. For further information on GS2SLS we refer to Drukker et
al. (2011).
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Finally, to the extent that our measure of social capital is endogenous, we will add as instruments
the previously discussed literacy and pc_institutions to matrix Xf 9 for the SARAR(1,1) and SEM
specification. We will also estimate a Spatial Durbin Model defined as:
y = ↵+X  +  W1y +  W2X + u (4.11)
Unfortunately the interpretation of the results of spatial models is not clear cut, as a change in
a single explanatory variable in region i has a direct impact on region i but also an indirect impact
on other regions. LeSage and Pace (2009) suggest the computation of the Average total direct
impact (ATDI) and the average total impact (ATI). ATDI is the average eﬀect of 1 unit change of
variable xik in region i (applied sequentially to each region). The ATI instead is the impact of a
simultaneous change in all regions of 1 unit in the variable of interest. Results from the SARAR
model (see table 4.10), using a GS2SLS estimator with standard instruments, indicate in all cases
significant spatial lags of the dependent variable and the error term, with all the measures of social
capital significant, although the coeﬃcients are now smaller compared to OLS. The ATDI and ATI,
expressed in percentage points of average GDP, are positive (i.e. 1 unit increase in social capital
results in a positive increase in average GDP) and not negligible (1 unit increase in pc_culture
results in an increase of 1.3 percentage points, with respect to the average of GDP10). As for the
SEM (table 4.11), we can observe an increase in the precision of the estimates with respect to OLS,
but the coeﬃcient of the spatial lag of the error term is significant only in the second specification,
with pc_culture_pos, while, following the results in table 4.8 we were expecting the first and third
specification to be significant.
These first results suggest a scope for a spatial regression approach. However, even in this case
the results may be biased by the potential endogeneity of our measures of social capital. We add
two groups of instrumental variables to the GS2SLS estimator: the first group includes the same
instruments proposed by Tabellini (2010), i.e. literacy and pc_institutions; in the second group
we add these variables and their spatial lags, W qX, with q = 1, 2 depending on the specification
(q = 2 for the SARAR(1,1), q = 1 for the SEM). We want to investigate whether the inclusion of
9See previous note
10Results for pc1 are likely a computational error since the values of ⇢ and   should be bounded between  1 and
1. As these routines are still under development, it seems plausible.
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these instruments might reduce the endogeneity problem. We present results in table 4.12, 4.13 and
4.14. Results for the SARAR(1,1) estimation (table 4.12) report positive and significant coeﬃcients
of social capital, albeit smaller than in the OLS specification. We have evidence of significant
spatial autocorrelation of both the dependent variable and the error term, with the exception of
pc_culture_pos. As for the strength of the instruments, unfortunately the routines implementing
GS2SLS are are still under development and miss some important features such as the first-stage F
statistic (which we had to compute manually), let alone the Cragg-Donald or the Kleibergen-Paap
statistics. To the extent we want to test the strength of our instruments, we have to rely only
the first-stage F statistic. As before (see tables 4.6 and 4.7) it seems that only the specification
with pc_culture_pos as proxy of social capital has "good" properties in terms of strength of the
instruments, as we have first-stage F close to 10 with both groups of instruments, slightly larger
including the spatial lags of the original IVs. ATDI and ATI are similar, albeit smaller, compared to
previous estimation, with the exception of the two new measures of social capital, pc1 and pc1_val.
As for the SEM (table 4.13), the coeﬃcients of the spatial lag of the error term are significant only in
the case of pc_culture_pos which is also the only one with first stage F statistic above 10. Overall,
results point towards the specification with pc_culture_pos with a spatial lag of the error term.
ATI and ATDI (table 4.14) again are positive and sizable. Finally, table 4.15 reports on the Spatial
Durbin model, suggesting all the measures of social capital are positive and significant, although
only the specification with pc_children and pc1 have significant spatial lags.
4.4 Wrap up of the chapter
In this chapter we replicate Tabellini (2010) work on social capital and growth of european regions
whose logic is that historical institutions aﬀect nowadays culture (intended as civic, social and
economic behaviour), instead of contemporary institutions, which in turn has eﬀect on economic
growth. We followed the estimation strategy described in figure 4.1, at first estimating eq. 4.1
via OLS, introducing two new measures of social capital. Then resorting to instrumental variable
estimation. Results are consistent with Tabellini (2010). However, following Stock and Yogo (2002),
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Table 4.9: Two stage least square (2SLS) estimation [with robust s.e.] with new instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES yp9500
school 0.26 0.75 0.37 -0.87 0.12
(0.53) (0.49) (0.55) (0.81) (0.58)
[0.32] [0.28] [0.35] [0.63] [0.38]
urb_rate1850 0.52** 0.66*** 0.49** 0.40 0.23
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.28) (0.27)
[0.19] [0.16] [0.18] [0.25] [0.31]
pc_culture 1.05
(0.24)***
[0.24]***
pc_culture_pos 1.13***
(0.25)
[0.30]
pc_children 1.20***
(0.32)
[0.28]
pc1 30.1***
(8.44)
[9.63]
pc1_val 24.3***
(6.79)
Observations 63 63 63 63 63
Sargan’s stat. p-value 0.22 0.18 0.066 0.61 0.06
Hansen J stat. p-value 0.56 0.49 0.44 0.35 0.05
Cragg-Donald stat. 4.89 7.10 3.42 2.32 3.24
Kleibergen-Paap rk 4.89 7.69 3.65 3.79 3.24
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sargan [Hansen J] tests
the null of exogeneity. Cragg-Donald [Kleibergen-Paap] tests the presence of weak iv.
List of instruments: literacy, pc_institutions, W ⇤ literacy_spl, W 2 ⇤ literacy_spl2,
W ⇤ pc_institutions, W 2 ⇤ pc_institutions
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we identified a likely problem of weak instruments, with the exception of the specification with
pc_culture_pos as measure of social capital. Introducing a concept of neighbourhood based on first
order queen contiguity, summarized by matrix W , we computed the spatial lags of the instruments
previously used. However, attempts to resolve the weak instruments problem by using the spatial
lags as additional instruments were unsatisfactory. All in all, jointly with spatial autocorrelation of
the residuals, we were induced to consider a spatial regression framework, as suggested by LeSage
and Fischer (2008). Results from SARAR(1,1), SEM and Spatial Durbin model, point to a spatial
specification of eq. 4.1 although results are mixed. In SARAR(1,1) and SEM estimations considering
the endogeneity of social capital, preliminary results (as the computational routines are still under
development) point towards the specification based on pc_culture_pos with a spatial lag of the error
term. Eventually, we are able to extend the work of Tabellini in a number of directions:
1. use of new measures of social capital;
2. focus on the problem of weak instruments;
3. use of a spatial regression framework;
4. use of a spatial regression considering an endogenous regressor.
Results from tests and regressions suggest that spatial regression models are necessary and can
help improving the estimation. However, further research may be necessary in order to identify the
exact spatial specification. However, the significative eﬀect of contiguity is suggestive of the need to
adopt policies favouring the adoption of specific institutions creating the required values and beliefs
necessary to growth. Indeed, to the extent that social capital is spatially sticky, as we have seen,
EU Cohesion policy could consider targeted programs for clusters of regions instead of each region
per se. Given the size of the allocated resources (366.8 EUR billions for the period 2014-20), small
amounts could be diverted to specific inter-regional programs fostering social capital, studying the
eﬀects in the successive EU policy cycles.
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Table 4.10: SARAR(1,1) regression
VARIABLES yp9500
school 0.36 0.58* 0.4 -0.08 0.29
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.39) (0.33)
urb_rate1850 0.78*** 0.81*** 0.77*** 0.81*** 0.65***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
pc_culture 0.32**
(0.14)
pc_culture_pos 0.49***
(0.17)
pc_children 0.33*
(0.17)
pc1 5.32**
(2.54)
pc1_val 9.30***
(3.27)
  0.74*** 0.60*** 0.82*** 1.08*** 0.82***
(0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16)
⇢ -0.87*** -0.87*** -0.84*** -1.02*** -0.92***
(0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.19) (0.21)
Observations 63 63 63 63 63
GS2SLS estimator with standard instruments. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Average direct and total impact (ATDI/ATI)
pc_culture pc_culture_pos pc_children pc1 pc1_val
ATDI 0.41 0.55 0.46 2.01 12.96
ATI 1.25 1.22 1.82 -70.43 51.27
as percentage of average GDP
ATDI 0.4 0.6 0.5 2.1 13.3
ATI 1.3 1.3 1.9 -72.4 52.7
As a remainder: average GDP growth between 1995-2000: 97.3
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Table 4.11: Spatial error model (SEM)
VARIABLES yp9500
school 0.64 0.92** 0.69 0.33 0.6
(0.45) (0.4) (0.48) (0.53) (0.47)
urb_rate1850 0.66*** 0.75*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.51**
(0.2) (0.19) (0.2) (0.21) (0.22)
pc_culture 0.61***
(0.13)
pc_culture_pos 0.79***
(0.13)
pc_children 0.62***
(0.16)
pc1 9.83***
(3.1)
pc1_val 13.0***
(3.34)
⇢ -0.29 -0.48** -0.12 -0.074 -0.23
(0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.18) (0.23)
Observations 63 63 63 63 63
GS2SLS estimator with standard instruments. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.14: Average direct and total impact (ATDI/ATI): GS2SLS SARAR(1,1)
SARAR(1,1) estimation with first group (1) of instruments
pc_culture pc_culture_pos pc_children pc1 pc1_val
ATDI 0.51 0.67 0.61 8.63 15.50
ATI 0.97 1.15 1.22 44.47 40.74
as percentage of average GDP
ATDI 0.5 0.7 0.6 8.9 15.9
ATI 1.0 1.2 1.3 45.7 41.9
SARAR(1,1) estimation with second group (2) of instruments
pc_culture pc_culture_pos pc_children pc1 pc1_val
ATDI 0.58 0.74 0.53 9.31 29.55
ATI 1.03 1.15 1.44 42.16 324.19
as percentage of average GDP
ATDI 0.6 0.8 0.5 9.6 30.4
ATI 1.1 1.2 1.5 43.3 333.1
As a remainder: average GDP growth between 1995-2000: 97.3
(1) instruments used: standard instruments plus literacy, pc_institutions.
(2) instruments used: standard instruments plus literacy, pc_institutions,
W ⇤ literacy_spl, W 2 ⇤ literacy_spl2, W ⇤ pc_institutions,
W 2 ⇤ pc_institutions.
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Table 4.15: Spatial Durbin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES yp9500
yp9500_spl 0.07 -0.25 0.14 -0.32 -0.36
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.25)
school 0.36 0.60 0.39 -0.23 0.50
(0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.60) (0.61)
urb_rate1850 0.47** 0.66*** 0.49** 0.86*** 0.59***
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
school_spl -0.31 -0.44 -0.16 -3.05** -1.06
(0.99) (0.95) (0.97) (1.23) (0.97)
urb_rate1850_spl 0.34 0.74* 0.30 1.30*** 0.59
(0.37) (0.40) (0.35) (0.41) (0.37)
pc_culture 0.65***
(0.16)
pc_culture_spl -0.41
(0.36)
pc_culture_pos 0.64***
(0.18)
pc_culture_pos_spl 0.42
(0.47)
pc_children 0.76***
(0.20)
pc_children_spl -0.86**
(0.36)
pc1 11.9***
(3.28)
pc1_spl 19.8**
(8.47)
pc1_val 10.0***
(3.43)
pc1_val_spl 11.8
(8.77)
Observations 63 63 63 63 63
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the identification strategy
Figure 4.2: Map of the area of analysis
Darker colour for the involved regions
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Final remarks
Social capital is an incredibly popular research topic in the social sciences. Much have been said and
many studies have been drafted, and yet the subject still seems to require refinement in terms of
concept, empirical measures and theoretical framework. For this reason, in this thesis we have first
summarized the existing literature on the definition and measurement of social capital. Then, we
have proposed a Principal component analysis (PCA) to derive new measures of social capital and
considered their distribution across space and time. Finally, we have considered the role of social
capital in spurring economic growth at regional level in Europe.
In particular, in Chapter 1 we have summarized the literature concerning social capital, starting
from its definitions across social sciences such as sociology, political science and economics. While in
sociology social capital is perceived either as a personal resource or in terms of ties and networks; in
political science it is rooted in the idea of values and beliefs determining the fate of a community, such
as the amoral familism of Banfield (1958) or the civicness of Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995).
Economists, on the other hand, have long ignored the concept up to the 90s, most likely because of
the diﬃculties of integrating non-market interactions into standard theoretical frameworks (Manski,
2000). The main problem of social capital, its definition, is the subject of section 1.1.2 where we
build on the contribution of Solow (1995) whose two requirements represent a turning point in the
debate; these suggestions are: a well defined investment/depreciation process and a clear measurable
empirical counterpart. Taking these issues into account Guiso et al. (2011) develop the concept of
“civic capital” ("those persistent values and shared beliefs, which allow a group to overcome the free
rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities").
Also, we investigate the channels through which social capital aﬀects economic growth with
respect to a non-comprehensive list that includes: crime, corruption, trust, thriftiness, productivity,
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ethnicity, religion and, last but not least, migration. A non-exhaustive review of the empirical
literature for each channel is presented. In this literature, the decisive role of trust seems to emerge,
a value particularly relevant when transactions involve some unknown counterpart, over a period of
time and when the legal protection is imperfect. However, as suggested by Righi and Scalise (2013),
it is necessary to pay attention to the diﬀerence between personalized and generalized trust, as the
former is a belief of trustworthiness regarding only certain people or groups whether generalized
trust refers to the whole society.
Recent empirical literature has also highlighted the role of space in terms of strength of ties and
type of migration: while short-distance migration may be consistent with keeping strong ties, on the
opposite, long-distance migration should imply weak ties. This has repercussions on social capital as
longer distance migration may also imply that the destination community is culturally more distant,
making migrants less trusting. Therefore the need to study the spatial distribution of social capital.
Unfortunately there are serious issue of identification due to the presence of specific confounding
factors, namely human capital, culture and institutions. Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 analyse and discuss
these issues in order to shed some light. Keeping in mind Solow’s critique, we select and present
(see section 1.3) four models of cultural transmission which capture the dynamics of (dis)investment
of social capital, focusing on the role of parents and of the socio-economic environments. Moreover,
some of these models provide an explanation for values persistence and impact on policy.
In particular, Bisin and Verdier (2001, 2005, 2011), introduce the concept of direct and indirect
socialization, and imperfect empathy. Benabou and Tirole (2006), derive a model with multiple
equilibria on beliefs of luck and eﬀect on welfare system. Guiso et al. (2008a) model suggest social
capital persistence. Finally, Tabellini (2008b) builds a model where cooperation is fostered by values
and beliefs, not reputation, based on geographical distance between individuals.
We have faced the operative problems of its measurement in Chapter 2. In section 2.1 we review
the available empirical measures by type of data source: survey data, experiments and outcome
based measures. Surveys attempt to measure directly those values and beliefs usually associated
to communities with high level of social capital. Alternatively, the use of experiments, whose main
advantage derives from imposing a well-defined structure, easing the task of interpreting results and
minimizing measurement errors. Eventually, the most used approach is based on indirect estimation,
by observing the eﬀects of social capital, the so called "outcome based measures". Advantages are
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the availability of longer time series (e.g. voter turnout), comparability across country and statistical
representativeness at sub national level. Unfortunately, they are also serious issues of endogeneity
and/or measurement errors. To the extent social relationships are grounded in space, there is a
role for space regarding social capital, as argued in section 2.2, being reminiscent of the first law of
geography: "everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant
things"(Tobler, 1970). Since social relations are spatially sticky, so are norms and values, with
several dimension of space that should be considered.
Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 present some distinctive trait of spatial statistics and econometrics,
such as the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP), introducing Exploratory space data analysis
(ESDA) techniques. In the context of standard measures of social capital in Europe, and to the
extent the focus is on spatial autocorrelation, we have proven that MAUP is a milder concern. In
section 2.2.4 we further explore the link between space and social capital in a dynamic context, with
an Exploratory space-time data analysis (ESTDA) at regional level in Europe. Similar values seem
to display a tendency to cluster, irrespective of the national border (and the forces they synthesize,
such as formal and informal institutions). In order to assess whether these clusters are spatially
significant, we have calculated Global and Local Moran’s I statistics which show some degree of
spatial association in the data and highlight the spatial clustering of regions with similar high or
low levels of social capital. Removing these reduces the probability that regions stay in the same
cluster. However, this eﬀect is at work not only on clusters of regions with high level of social
capital, but also on clus ters of regions with low levels of social capital. While the first can be
considered a positive eﬀect of national borders (as regions endowed with higher trusting attitudes
will likely keep these levels), the second clearly is not, as national borders (proxy of formal and
informal institutions) seem to prevent the spreading of similar values and beliefs, and trust in this
example.
Finally, section 2.3 reports a primer on Principal component analysis, a technique to achieve
data reduction, a priority issue in order to deal with multidimensionality of social capital.
Building on previous considerations, in Chapter 3 we have defined new measures of social capital
at sub national level in Europe, based on nine variables previously used in the literature. Five of
these can be referred to the so-called "structural component” of social capital (see Righi and Scalise
2013) and include: voter turnout at parliamentary elections (Putnam, 1993; Nannicini et al., 2010),
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relational intensity, and “media use” of Newspapers, Radio and TV (Putnam, 1993; de Dominicis et
al., 2013) as a way to achieve information. The remaining variables refer to the so called “cognitive
component” of social capital and consider the perception of norms, values and beliefs. Here, in
line with the literature on social capital, we consider variables that should capture the attitude of
individuals towards the community, such as the perception of one’s control over life, the importance
of respect for the others as a value to teach your children, the extent of generalized trust and
autonomy. The correlation analysis of the variables involved seems to suggest that the representation
of social capital may be more complex than typically postulated and corroborates the need for a
multidimensional approach. Next, we try to encapsulate the information from the above variables
into synthetic indicators, which should capture the many dimensions of civic capital. Obviously,
the process of condensing complex phenomena into single indicators presents a clear trade-oﬀ: on
one side, it eases the burden of the researcher on the interpretation of several results jointly; on
the other, it may oversimplify the complexity of the problem under scrutiny, while the synthetic
measures obtained may be questioned on the grounds of the aggregation procedure used. Being
aware of this trade-oﬀ, we have achieved variables’ reduction thorough PCA. Our empirical analysis
has confirmed that these variables may capture diﬀerent aspects of the same phenomenon. Also, the
distinction between the structural and the cognitive component seems to be blurred. We consider
the first principal components of the two subsets of variables, the full set of variables and a refined
set as robustness check. These synthetic indicators seem to indicate some degree of heterogeneity
in the distribution of social capital across European regions, especially within larger countries, such
as Italy, France, Poland and Spain, and with higher values usually characterizing smaller countries
(Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands). This analysis confirms previous findings that these clusters are
not necessarily “national”, suggesting that the forces of geography may overcome national borders
when it comes to cultural identities.
In the last chapter, building on Tabellini (2010), which states that historical institutions aﬀects
current economic growth via social capital (defined as "culture"), we proceed diﬀerently with respect
to a more traditional line of research identifying contemporary institutions as the channel. The
estimation strategy is described in figure 4.1: as first step, eq. 4.1 is estimated with OLS, introducing
the new measures of social capital discussed in chapter 4. As second step, following the likely
endogeneity of social capital, the use of instrumental variable estimation. Results are consistent
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with Tabellini (2010). However, following Stock and Yogo (2002), we identified a plausible problem
of weak instruments, i.e. weak correlations of one of the instrument with the endogenous variable,
with the exception of the specification focusing only on "‘positive"’ values that should be taught
to children (pc_culture_pos) as measure of social capital. Introducing a concept of neighbourhood
based on first order queen contiguity, summarized by matrix W , we computed the spatial lags
of the instruments previously used. However, attempt to resolve the weak instruments problem
by using the spatial lags were unsatisfactory. All in all, jointly with spatial autocorrelation of the
residuals, this evidence induced to consider a spatial regression approach, as suggested by LeSage and
Fischer (2008). Results from a Spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive disturbances
(SARAR), a Spatial error model (SEM) and a Spatial Durbin model (SDM), confirm the need
for a spatial approach in dealing with eq. 4.1 although it did not emerge any clear indication on
which specification should be used. It’s possible to specify the endogeneity of the measures of social
capital although the results are necessarily preliminary as the computational routines are still under
development; overall the results of the spatial specifications point towards the specification based
on pc_culture_pos with a spatial lag of the error term. Eventually, the contribution with respect
to Tabellini (2010) pertains to:
1. use of new measures of social capital;
2. focus on the problem of weak instruments;
3. use of a spatial regression framework;
4. use of a spatial regression considering an endogenous regressor.
Results from tests and regression suggests that spatial regression models are indeed suggested
despite being necessary further research in order to identify the exact spatial specification. However,
the significative eﬀect of contiguity is suggestive of the need to adopt policies favouring the adoption
of specific institutions creating the required values and beliefs necessary to growth. Indeed, EU
Cohesion policy could consider targeted programs for clusters of regions instead of each region per
se. Considered the amount of resources available, a small part could be diverted to study the eﬀects
of specific inter-regional programs promoting social capital.
Within the limits and the scope of this thesis, this conclude our journey across the domain of
social capital: from the theoretical issues related to the definition, across a review of empirical
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measures, defining new measures later used in a within country analysis. Clearly, there are still
several issues open regarding measurement, spatial inference at sub national level, identification
(with particular reference to institutions) and cultural transmission models. We endeveour to make
these issues the object of future research.
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